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Abstract: An issue common to many common law jurisdictions is the
question of civil claims based on alleged past sexual abuse brought a
long time after the events. Many survivors of such abuse only make the
allegations public, if ever, many years after the abuse took place. Each
jurisdiction has time limits within which civil claims must be brought.
There are generally sound policy reasons for such limits: to discourage
lax attempts to enforce or vindicate claims; to respect the right of the
defendant to not have stale claims brought; and to allow for a fair trial
given the likelihood that the quality of evidence will deteriorate over
time. However, it is difficult to impose such regimes on survivors of
sexual abuse who come forward much later. The paper explores psycho-
logical literature that helps to explain why it is that such victims may
only come forward, if ever, many years after the events. It is submitted
that legal systems generally need to take a much more flexible approach
to extension of time claims in such contexts, and avoid judgments as to
when a victim ‘should have’ brought their claim. It will be concluded
that the approach of several Canadian provinces, removing the limita-
tion period in such cases, is the preferred approach.
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I. Introduction
One of law’s difficult issues is how to deal with cases in which sur-
vivors1 of child sexual abuse wish to bring civil action against the
alleged abusers a long time after the incident(s).2 In cases which are
* Associate Professor, University of Southern Queensland; e-mail:
Anthony.Gray@usq.edu.au
1 In accordance with most of the literature, this word will be used rather than the
term ‘victim’.
2 It should be acknowledged at this point that similar issues can arise in relation to
other kinds of abuse, for example physical and emotional, and that in some cases
the victim of the abuse is not a minor. However, for the purposes of the paper, the
focus will be on child sexual abuse cases. It is believed that many, if not all, of the
conclusions reached in the paper are also applicable to other types of abuse
against children. Further, rather than use the term ‘alleged’ abuse throughout the
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the subject of this paper, issues have arisen as to whether the claim is
within the statutory limitation period within which claims must be
made, which raises broader issues about the rationale for such limita-
tion periods, and whether this rationale is relevant to such cases. It
has proved difficult for the law to be sensitive to such survivors, in
terms of understanding why the survivor may not seek civil legal
redress until many years down the track, and finding some way to
develop and apply legal rules that can accommodate these situations,
while also ensuring that the trial is a fair one.
As will be shown later in the paper, most of the Australian jurisdic-
tions studied, as well as England, Canada and most of the United
States, have embraced the concept of ‘discoverability’ in relation to
such claims.3 In other words, the time within which a claim must be
brought will be delayed until such time as the injuries that result
become ‘discoverable’. It will be seen, as expected, that there is vari-
ation among jurisdictions as to the precise meaning of ‘discover-
ability’. It will be argued in this paper that, as demonstrated by some
recent cases, the law in several jurisdictions is not satisfactory in this
area, in particular with its consideration of the issue of the ‘reason-
ableness’ of the response of the survivor of the abuse in terms of time
in applying the ‘discoverability’ principle. These issues are of course
not confined to one nation, and comparisons will be made with how
other common law countries have grappled with these issues.
In Part II of the paper, some of the vast psychological literature on
these issues is discussed, to help our understanding of why there can
be a long delay between the alleged incidents and the complaint being
made, and to better understand the position of the survivor of such
abuse. It is implicit in the inclusion of this material that the author
believes that as a general principle, courts have not been sensitive in
their dealing with these matters to the extremely difficult position in
which survivors of such abuse find themselves, and why many do not
complain for a long time, if ever, about the events. In Part III, it is
thought necessary to remind ourselves of the rationale for limitation
periods, to consider their applicability in cases with which this paper
is concerned. Discoverability is a concept that many common law
jurisdictions use in assessing applications to extend limitation
periods, so current case law from five common law jurisdictions is
considered in order to see what the different approaches have been to
questions of discoverability in the present context. It is necessary to
consider the facts of these cases in some depth in order to test
paper, it will be acknowledged at the start that, in respect of some of the cases
discussed, the abuse was not proven by the relevant standard of proof (because
the claim was deemed to be out of time so the trial did not proceed). Of course,
any claims of abuse need to be proven by the relevant standard of proof.
3 New Zealand formerly took this approach, but its jurisprudence has now moved
in a different direction.
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whether the law in this area is being applied in ways that deliver
satisfactory outcomes, or whether they suggest the need for (further)
reform. In Part IV of the paper, a critique of aspects of the current
approaches is offered, accepting that it is very difficult to develop
legal principles in this area that will do ‘justice’ in every case. How-
ever, accepting this caveat, possible solutions to the identified prob-
lem will be considered, and recommendations made as to how the law
could best balance the various competing interests involved in these
very difficult cases.4
II. Some Psychological Evidence Explaining Delays in
Disclosure
There is substantial literature documenting the reasons for the failure
of survivors of sexual abuse to report the events over a long period. It
is only relatively recently that the extent of childhood sexual abuse
and its long-term consequences have become better understood.5
First, the survivor of the abuse may be suffering from what psy-
chiatrists term ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’, or PTSD. Many vic-
tims of sexual assault exhibit symptoms of PTSD, with studies
estimating the percentages of rape survivors who develop the dis-
order at between 31 and 65 per cent,6 73 per cent,7 86 per cent lifetime
PTSD and 72 per cent current PTSD,8 and 92 per cent.9 Between 38
4 Space restrictions mean the paper cannot dwell in detail on whether there should
be a general residual discretion for the court to allow an action to proceed
although it is out of time, and the interpretation of provisions allowing limitation
periods to not run when the claim was fraudulently concealed in some way.
5 For example, Rosenfeld states that prior to 1960 the psychiatric literature
concerning childhood sexual abuse was negligible, limited to ‘relationships
between “retarded” and seductive girls and their sociopathic fathers’: Alan
Rosenfeld, ‘The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases:
The Equitable Estoppel Remedy’ (1989) 12 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 206.
6 Cathy Widom, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Abused and Neglected Children
Grown Up’ (1999) 156 American Journal of Psychiatry 1223.
7 K. O’Neill and K. Gupta, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Women Who Were
Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse’ (1991) 8 Irish Journal of Psychological
Medicine 124. 
8 Ned Rodriguez, Susan Ryan, Anderson Rowan and David Foy, ‘Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder in a Clinical Sample of Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual
Abuse’ (1996) 20 Child Abuse and Neglect 943; Lynne Briggs and Peter Joyce,
‘What Determines Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptomatology for Survivors
of Childhood Sexual Abuse?’ (1997) 21 Child Abuse and Neglect 575; Dawn
Johnson, Julie Pike and Kathleen Chard, ‘Factors Predicting PTSD, Depression
and Dissociative Severity in Female Treatment-Seeking Childhood Sexual Abuse
Survivors’ (2001) 25 Child Abuse and Neglect 179.
9 E.A. Saunders, ‘Rorschach Indicators of Chronic Childhood Sexual Abuse in
Female Borderline Patients’ (1991) 55 Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic 48. 
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
344
and 43 per cent met the diagnostic criteria for major depression.10 The
PTSD disorder, which has only been officially recognized since 1980,
involves three criteria:
(a) the stressor criterion—an unusually traumatic event involving
actual or threatened death or serious physical injury where the
patient felt intense fear, horror or helplessness;
(b) the intrusive recollection criterion—the patient repeatedly re-
lives the event through dreams, flashbacks, responses to cues
symbolizing the event or physiological responses to them; and
(c) the avoidance criterion—the patient persistently avoids trauma-
related stimuli, and has numbed general responsiveness as
shown by at least three of the following: avoiding thoughts,
feelings or conversations associated with the event; avoiding
activities, people or places that recall the event; an inability to
remember an important aspect of the event.11
This avoidance criterion helps to explain why many survivors of
sexual abuse never come forward,12 or only come forward many years
after the events took place. They may not even remember some of the
events associated with the abuse.13 In one study, 46 per cent of sur-
veyed victims of incest reported some degree of memory loss, while
10 D.G. Kilpatrick and R. Acierno, ‘Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims:
Epidemiology and Outcomes’ (2003) 16 Journal of Traumatic Stress 119;
D.G. Kilpatrick, A.B. Amstadter, H.S. Resnick and K.J. Ruggiero, ‘Rape-Related
PTSD: Issues and Interventions’ (2007) 24 Psychiatric Times 50; M.P. Koss,
J.A. Bailey, N.P. Yuan, V.M. Herrera and E.L. Lichter, ‘Depression and PTSD in
Survivors of Male Violence: Research and Training Initiatives to Facilitate
Recovery’ (2003) 27 Psychology of Women Quarterly 130; Amy Silverman, Helen
Reinherz and Rose Giaconia, ‘The Long-Term Sequelae of Child and Adolescent
Abuse: A Longitudinal Community Study’ (1996) 20 Child Abuse and Neglect 709.
11 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 4th edn (American Psychiatric Association: Philadelphia, 2000).
Meiselman pointed out that the child may also dissociate during the abuse,
delaying the onset of the post-traumatic stress reaction: Karin Meiselman,
Resolving the Trauma of Incest: Reintegration Therapy With Survivors (Jossey-
Bass: San Francisco, 1990) 46.
12 R.F. Hanson, H.S. Resnick, B.E. Saunders, D.G. Kilpatrick and C. Best, ‘Factors
Related to the Reporting of Childhood Rape’ (1999) 23 Child Abuse and Neglect
559; J.M. Leventhal, ‘Epidemiology of Sexual Abuse of Children: Old Problems,
New Directions’ (1998) 22 Child Abuse and Neglect 481. In the survey conducted
by Catalina Arata, only 31 per cent of survivors of child sexual abuse reported it:
‘To Tell or Not to Tell: Current Functioning of Child Sexual Abuse Survivors Who
Disclosed Their Victimisation’ (1998) 3 Child Maltreatment 63 at 66; Tina
Goodman-Brown, Robin Edelstein, Gail Goodman, David Jones and David
Gordon, ‘Why Children Tell: A Model of Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse’
(2003) 27 Child Abuse and Neglect 525. Another explanation for this is the so-
called stages of recovery from child sexual abuse: from (1) denial, (2) bargaining,
(3) anger, (4) sadness, and (5) acceptance or forgiveness. 
13 Freud in 1893 apparently identified the concept of suppression in the context of
survivors of child abuse, only to recant later: Lonnie Richardson, ‘Missing Pieces
of Memory: A Rejection of “Type” Classifications and a Demand for a More
Subjective Approach Regarding Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse’
(1999) 11 St Thomas Law Review 515 at 516–17; Cynthia Bowman and Elizabeth
Mertz, ‘A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor
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28 per cent experienced severe memory impairment.14 The law re-
garding limitation periods needs to accommodate these experiences
of child abuse survivors.15
Secondly, the existence of secondary victimization, where the sur-
vivor of abuse is further traumatized by the legal proceedings that
might surround it, is well documented. For example, surveys of abuse
victims have found that from between 43 per cent and 52 per cent of
victims who had contact with the legal system rated their experiences
as unhelpful or hurtful.16 Many survivors report that, if they had
known beforehand of the way in which the crime would be dealt with
by the legal system, they would not have reported the abuse.17 Re-
searchers have found that among sexual abuse survivors who had
contact with the legal system, many reported that as a result of that
Therapy’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 549 at 615; Sigmund Freud, ‘The
Aetiology of Hysteria’ in The Freud Reader (W.W. Norton: London, 1989) 97,
103–4.
14 J.L. Herman and E. Schatzow, ‘Recovery and Verification of Memories of
Childhood Sexual Trauma’ (1987) 4 Psychoanalytic Psychologist 1; these findings
were broadly replicated by Briere who found that 42–59 per cent of 450 survivors
of sexual abuse were able to identify some time when they were unable to
remember the abuse: John Briere and Jon Conte, ‘Self-Reported Amnesia for
Abuse in Adults Molested as Children’ (1993) 6 Journal of Traumatic Stress 21;
John Briere and D.M. Elliott, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Associated With Delayed
Recall of Sexual Abuse: A General Population Study’ (1995) 8 Journal of Traumatic
Stress 628; Sheila Taub, ‘The Legal Treatment of Recovered Memories of Child
Sexual Abuse’ (1996) 17 Journal of Legal Medicine 183; Shirley Feldman-Summers
and Kenneth Pope, ‘The Experience of Forgetting Childhood Abuse: A National
Survey of Psychologists’ (1994) 62 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology
636; Cynthia Bowman and Elizabeth Mertz, ‘A Dangerous Direction: Legal
Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review
549; J. Douglas Bremner, ‘Dissociation and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in
Vietnam Combat Veterans’ (1992) 149 American Journal of Psychiatry 328.
15 As Ben Mathews, who has written extensively in this area, concludes: ‘It is
therefore a normal and reasonable response by adult survivors of child sexual
abuse with PTSD to avoid any activity—including legal action—that would require
detailed reliving and description of the events, adversarial testing of their account
of those events, and confrontation of the perpetrator’: ‘Judicial Considerations of
Reasonable Conduct by Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse’ (2004) 27 University of
New South Wales Law Journal 631 at 635.
16 Rebecca Campbell, ‘The Psychological Impact of Rape Victims’ Experiences With
the Legal, Medical and Mental Health Systems’ (2008) American Psychologist 702;
Rebecca Campbell and P.Y. Martin, ‘Services for Sexual Assault Survivors: The
Role of Rape Crisis Centres’ in C. Renzetti, J. Edleson and R. Bergen (eds),
Sourcebook on Violence Against Women (Sage: California, 2001); J.M. Golding,
J.M. Siegel, S.B. Sorenson, M.A. Burnam and J.A. Stein, ‘Social Support Sources
Following Sexual Assault’ (1989) 17 Journal of Community Psychology 92;
Henrietta Filipas and Sarah Ullman, ‘Social Reactions to Sexual Assault Victims
From Various Support Sources’ (2001) 16 Violence and Victims 673; L.M. Monroe,
L.M. Kinney, M.D. Weist, D.S. Dafeamekpor, J. Dantzler and M.W. Reynolds, ‘The
Experience of Sexual Assault: Findings from a Statewide Victim Needs
Assessment’ (2005) 20 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 767; Sarah Ullman, ‘Do
Social Reactions to Sexual Assault Victims Vary by Support Provider?’ (1996) 11
Violence and Victims 143.
17 T. Logan, L. Evans, E. Stevenson and C.E. Jordan, ‘Barriers to Services for Rural
and Urban Survivors of Rape’ (2005) 20 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 591.
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contact they felt bad about themselves (87 per cent), depressed (71 per
cent), violated (89 per cent), distrustful of others (53 per cent), and
reluctant to seek further help (80 per cent).18 Many researchers have
found that contact with formal help mechanisms, including police,
was more likely to result in post-traumatic stress disorder symptom-
atology.19 An earlier study found that adult survivors who sought help
were likely to encounter professionals showing emotional resistance,
little knowledge and skills, and a tendency to blame the victim.20
One must remember also that in many cases, where a victim does
disclose details of the abuse to a person in a trusted position, the
victim is not believed. Of course, this is not going to encourage the
victim to report it to others. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions21 which investigated
a large number of church- and community organization-run orphan-
ages and children’s homes and detention centres found that:
There was a failure to recognize the risk of abuse to children, a failure to
treat children with sufficient respect to ensure their feeling able to com-
plain, and a failure to give complaints sufficient credence. The last per-
meated most of the institutions under consideration here. Those who
did complain were not believed by workers, priests or police. The fol-
lowing response to a report of sexual abuse is typical of what was
described: ‘I told Mr P and all Mr P did was backhand me across the
18 Rebecca Campbell, ‘What Really Happened? A Validation Study of Rape
Survivors’ Help-Seeking Experiences With the Legal and Medical Systems’ (2005)
20 Violence and Victims 55; Rebecca Campbell and S. Raja, ‘The Sexual Assault
and Secondary Victimisation of Female Veterans: Help Seeking Experiences in
Military and Civilian Social Systems’ (2005) 29 Psychology of Women Quarterly 97.
19 Filipas and Ullman, above n. 16; L. Starzynski, Sarah Ullman, S.M. Townsend,
D.M. Long and S.M. Long, ‘What Factors Predict Women’s Disclosure of Sexual
Assault to Mental Health Professionals?’ (2007) 35 Journal of Community
Psychology 619; Sarah Ullman and Henrietta Filipas, ‘Correlates of Formal and
Informal Support Seeking in Sexual Assault Victims’ (2001) 16 Journal of
Interpersonal Violence 1028; Sarah Ullman and Henrietta Filipas, ‘Predictors of
PTSD Symptom Severity and Social Reactions in Sexual Assault Victims’ (2001) 14
Journal of Traumatic Stress 369.
20 J. Frenken and B. Van Stolk, ‘Incest Victims: Inadequate Help by Professionals’
(1990) 14 Child Abuse and Neglect 253. A similar result was found more recently
by Micaela Crisma, Elisabetta Bascelli, Daniela Paci and Patrizia Romito in
‘Adolescents Who Experienced Sexual Abuse: Fears, Needs and Impediments to
Disclosure’ (2004) 28 Child Abuse and Neglect 1035. This study found that among
adolescent survivors of abuse who reported it, many claimed that professionals
ignored the problem, minimized the abuse, or blamed the victim (at 1043);
D.W. Smith, E.J. Letourneau, B.E. Saunders, D.G. Kilpatrick, H.S. Resnick and
C.L. Best, ‘Delay in Disclosure of Childhood Rape: Results from a National Survey’
(2000) 24 Child Abuse and Neglect 273; G.E. Wyatt, T. Burns Loeb, B. Solis and
J. Vargas Carmona, ‘The Prevalence and Circumstances of Child Sexual Abuse:
Changes Across a Decade’ (1999) 23 Child Abuse and Neglect 45. 
21 Forde Inquiry (1999).
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mouth. He said: “Where would you be if it wasn’t for the priests and
the nuns? How dare you talk about the priests and the nuns like
that?”’22
As Mosher has said:
Disclosures of any and all forms of childhood sexual abuse by children
and by adults recalling their childhood were thought until recently to be,
in the main, fantastic or vindictive. Children were assumed not to be
able to separate fact and fantasy and their accounts of sexual abuse
were presumed to rest largely in fantasy not fact. Female adults who
revealed later in life the trauma of their early lives were often labelled as
vindictive . . . If the sexual nature of the relationship between child and
adult was in fact acknowledged, its formation was often attributed to the
seductiveness of the female child.23
In one study, more than 75 per cent of those survivors interviewed
stated that they were worried about future harm and distress. A sim-
ilar percentage did not believe that formal social systems could have
helped them, or would likely have worsened the situation.24 Of those
that did not disclose, reasons are often divided into three categories—
personal barriers including lack of cognitive awareness, relational
barriers, or fear of the response from others, and sociocultural bar-
riers, including fears that it was not acceptable to society to be a
victim of abuse, or fears (in the case of male victims) of being labelled
gay.25 Forgetting about the abuse is often seen as a self-preservation
22 ‘The Inquiry noted evidence which it accepted from a witness M who had lived at
one of the orphanages since infancy. He told of being sexually abused at the age
of 11 or 12 by a Father, the resident chaplain at St Vincent’s Orphanage between
1959 and 1963. M had been working in the garden at the priest’s college when he
was told to come into the house to be punished for damaging a plant. What
followed was the first of a number of attempts to sodomise the boy . . . this
occurred approximately 14 times over a two and a half year period. There was no
tenderness extended to M during this activity and his compliance was secured
unwillingly under the threat of being sent to [a notorious institution]. Ultimately
the priest’s advances culminated in . . . penetration while the boy was tied to the
Father’s bed. The boy’s anus was injured in the encounter, which was notified by
a visiting nun who saw him while he was attempting to wash the blood away. M
was taken to the infirmary and on his return to the Orphanage the Mother
Superior questioned him as to who had caused the injury. According to M, upon
being told of the perpetrator, she reacted angrily and with disbelief and had
beaten him for lying . . . there were at least three other children who had similar
experiences with the Father . . . all have been greatly affected into adult life’
(pp. 87–8 of the Report).
23 Janet Mosher, ‘Challenging Limitation Periods: Civil Claims by Adult Survivors of
Incest’ (1994) 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 169 at 171–3.
24 Debra Patterson, Megan Greeson and Rebecca Campbell, ‘Understanding Rape
Survivors’ Decisions Not to Seek Help from Social Systems’ (2009) 34 Health and
Social Work 127.
25 Lynn Sorsoli, Maryam Kia-Keating and Frances Grossman, ‘I Keep That Hush-
Hush: Male Survivors of Sexual Abuse and the Challenges of Disclosure’ (2008) 55
Journal of Counselling Psychology 333.
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mechanism,26 and many survivors report feeling ashamed about what
happened.27 Not surprisingly, the ‘worse’ the abuse was, the lower the
rate of disclosure.28 If the abuser and the survivor were related, dis-
closure rates tend to be lower,29 and there is a negative correlation
between the age of the survivor and disclosure rates.30
The Queensland Law Reform Commission in its Review of the
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) summarized the position well. It
found that an adult who was sexually abused as a child might react in
one of the following ways:
(a) not experience the symptoms of abuse for a substantial number
of years;
(b) experience the symptoms but fail to recall the abuse;
(c) remember the abuse, but fail to make the connection between it
and subsequent symptoms, because of either denial of the ef-
fects of the abuse, or continuing self-blame or failure to identify
the abusive conduct as wrongful; or
(d) remember the abuse and make the connection between it and
current symptoms but remain unable, because of the pain and
suffering involved, to seek compensation from the abuser.31
Psychologist Mic Hunter discusses five phases of recovery from child
sexual abuse: (1) denial; (2) bargaining; (3) anger; (4) sadness; and (5)
26 J.J. Freyd, Betrayal Trauma: The Logic of Forgetting Childhood Abuse (Harvard
University Press: Boston, 1996).
27 See Crisma, et al., above n. 20.
28 See Arata, above n. 12.
29 See Goodman-Brown, et al., above n. 12; Steven Kogan, ‘Disclosing Unwanted
Sexual Experiences: Results from a National Sample of Adolescent Women’ (2004)
28 Child Abuse and Neglect 147.
30 In other words, the younger the survivor, the less likely they are to disclose the
abuse: R.L. Sjoberg and F. Lindblad, ‘Delayed Disclosure and Disrupted
Communication During Forensic Investigation of Child Sexual Abuse: A Study of
47 Corroborated Cases’ (2002) 91 Acta Paediatrica 1391.
31 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report No 53 (Queensland, 1998) 159; as
Mullis concludes, ‘the effect of the abuse makes it very difficult for the victim to
complain. While she knows she has been abused, recognizes that she has
psychological problems and that these stem, at least in part, from the abuse, she
is psychologically unable to bring herself to complain. At least three reasons
might contribute to this. First, even when they reach majority, victims often
continue to blame themselves for the abuse. Such self-blame is a strong inhibitor
to disclosure. Secondly, complaining of abuse, particularly where the abuser is
part of the family, takes considerable courage and emotional strength. Yet, such
strength is often lacking in victims of child sexual abuse. Thirdly, even where the
abuse has ended, that does not necessarily mean that the “relationship” between
the abuser and abused has been terminated. The typical victim is abused by
someone she knows and trusts. In many of these cases, particularly where the
abuser is a parent, the abused may remain dependent on the abuser until well
after she reaches majority. In order to maintain this “support” and also to avoid
splitting up the family, the victim may feel a strong pressure not to disclose the
abuse’: A.C.L. Mullis, ‘Compounding the Abuse? The House of Lords, Childhood
Sexual Abuse and Limitation Periods’ (1997) 5 Medical Law Review 22 at 26. (The
original contains the gender-specific pronouns, but it is conceded that victims
may be female or male.)
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acceptance or forgiveness.32 It is argued that often survivors of child-
hood abuse seek to deny not the existence but the importance of the
abuse, making them unable to identify the link between the abuse and
their subsequent psychological problems. It is claimed to be only at
the third stage of anger that the victim is able to link the abuse with
their difficulties later in life.33
It is considered important to acknowledge also that, in some cases,
the allegations of abuse are false. One of the reasons for this is so-
called ‘false memory syndrome’, where some claimants truly believe
that abuse has occurred, whereas in fact it has not.34 As with any
claim, claims of abuse must be supported by appropriate levels of
evidence and the claimant must prove their case on the balance of
probabilities.
This psychological literature has been referred to at some length
here because it is submitted to be essential background understand-
ing when a court considers cases where survivors of child sexual
abuse come forward many years after the alleged incidents. The legal
system generally must understand the mental state of a survivor of
child sexual abuse, and be sensitive to the likely impact of such abuse
on the survivor, the stages which the survivor might go through in
dealing with the abuse, and reasons why the allegations may not
come to light until a long time afterwards.
The legal system must be slow to judge the reasonableness of the
survivor’s actions in coming forward years later, until it fully digests
and understands the psychological literature in this area. This com-
ment is made in light of the fact that in many of these cases, decisions
appear to be being made without express reference to such material.
32 Mic Hunter, Abused Boys: The Neglected Victims of Sexual Abuse (Random
House: New York, 1990) 99.
33 Ibid. at 106; Denise DeRose, ‘Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations:
The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages’ (1985) 25 Santa Clara Law
Review 191 at 196.
34 This possibility is explored in further detail by Gary Ernsdorff and Elizabeth
Loftus, ‘Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute
of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression’ (1994) 84 Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology 129; Lynn Holdsworth, ‘Is It Repressed Memory With Delayed
Recall Or Is It False Memory Syndrome? The Controversy and its Potential Legal
Implications’ (1998) 22 Law and Psychology Review 103. One researcher estimated
that false complaints comprised 2–8 per cent of all reported cases: Judith Herman
and Mary Harvey, ‘The False Memory Debate: Social Science or Social Backlash?’
(1993) 9 Harvard Mental Health Letter 5. See also R. Christopher Yingling, ‘The
Ohio Supreme Court Sets the Statute of Limitations and Adopts the Discovery
Rule for Childhood Sexual Abuse Actions: Now it is Time for Legislative Action!’
(1995) 43 Cleveland State Law Review 499 and Jorge Carro and Joseph Hatala,
‘Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes of Limitations and Discovery Exceptions
in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We Gone Too Far?’ (1996) 23 Pepperdine
Law Review 1239.
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III. Rationale of Statutes of Limitation and Use of
Discoverability in Various Jurisdictions
It is now proposed to consider the rationale for statutes of limitation,
and specifically how discoverability has been applied as a concept in
this area in jurisdictions such as Australia, England, the United States,
Canada and New Zealand.
i. The Raison D’Eˆtre of Limitation Periods is Inappropriate in
These Cases
It is not a new problem for the law that legal principles, whether in
statute or the common law, are sometimes sought to be applied in
contexts far removed from the types of situations for which they were
originally designed. This creates real difficulties and the possibility of
injustice. It is suggested that this phenomenon exists in the law of
limitation periods, both in terms of the primary limitation period they
impose, as well as any extensions or exceptional cases. Specifically,
some of the extension provisions apply readily to the ‘I couldn’t have
known’ scenario; they are sometimes more difficult to apply to the ‘I
knew but didn’t want to admit it’ scenario.
The rationale for limitation periods has been set out in various
judgments. For example, McHugh J expressed it in Brisbane South
Regional Health Authority v Taylor35 in similar terms to that expressed
in the United States.36 In McHugh J’s words:
First, as time goes by, relevant evidence is likely to be lost. Second, it is
oppressive, even ‘cruel’ to a defendant to allow an action to be brought
long after the circumstances which gave rise to it have passed. Third,
people should be able to arrange their affairs and utilize their resources
on the basis that claims can no longer be made against them. Insurers,
public institutions and businesses, particularly limited liability com-
panies, have a significant interest in knowing that they have no liabilities
beyond a definite period. [McHugh J referred to a New South Wales
Law Reform Commission Report pointing out the benefits in allowing
the defendant to make the most productive use of their resources and
the disruptive effect of unsettled claims on commercial intercourse.]
Even where the cause of action relates to personal injuries, it will be
often just as unfair to make the shareholders, ratepayers or taxpayers of
today ultimately liable for a wrong of the distant past, as it is to refuse a
plaintiff the right to reinstate a spent action arising from that wrong.
35 (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 551.
36 The United States courts have embraced a similar rationale for limitation periods
as that accepted in other jurisdictions, stating that they ‘represent a pervasive
legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to
defend within a specific period of time . . . the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them . . . [such periods] protect
defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for
truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or
disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or
otherwise’: United States v Kubrick 444 US 111 at 117 (1978).
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The final rationale for limitation periods is that the public interest re-
quires that disputes be settled as quickly as possible.37
This rationale was referred to with approval and applied recently by
the Queensland Court of Appeal in HWC v Corporation of the Synod
of the Diocese of Brisbane to deny an applicant in a case involving
alleged sexual abuse by a teacher against a student an extension of
time to allow the allegations to be tested. Keane J noted that to deny
an extension of time in the case was more in accord with the legis-
lative policy underlying limitation statutes than to grant one.
With respect, several comments may be made about the above
passage and its applicability to the current context. (I will concede that
these comments were not made in the context of alleged child abuse,
but alleged medical negligence.) First, the question of whether evid-
ence is available or not is surely a matter for the courts to consider
when they assess the claim of the plaintiff, if the trial proceeds. Pre-
sumably, a plaintiff would not be encouraged to bring a claim if the
legal advisers are of the view that there is insufficient evidence to
convince the court of the case on the balance of probabilities. Further,
since there is no limitation period for criminal cases (except in some
parts of the United States), some prosecutions that involve child abuse
proceed many years after the alleged events.38 Possible concerns
about evidence being lost do not seem to have dissuaded prosecuting
authorities in those cases.
Secondly, the suggested ‘cruelty’ to the defendant in having matters
raised beyond the stated limitation period must be balanced with the
disgusting cruelty involved in child abuse. Many victims suffer ter-
ribly with these crimes, and often take many years, if ever, to come to
terms with the abuse and to report it. If, having gone through this
often long journey, the alleged victim comes to the legal system seek-
ing redress of wrongs, is it not extremely cruel for the legal door to be
closed upon them by being told they have left the matter too late?
McHugh J expressed the view that where the defendant could not
fairly defend themselves after the delay in bringing proceedings,
then:
The case is no longer one of presumptive prejudice. The defendant has
then proved what the legislature merely presumed would be the case.
Even on the hypothesis of presumptive prejudice, the legislature per-
ceives that society is best served by barring the plaintiff’s claim.39
37 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 554–5.
38 For example, in Re Kenny and the Queen (1991) 68 CCC (3d) 36 the allegations
related to sexual abuse 20 years prior but the trial proceeded. The court found
that delay alone did not impair the accused’s right to a fair trial. Similarly, there
were lengthy delays prior to trial in R v Birdsall (unreported, Supreme Court of
New South Wales, Court of Appeal, Cole JA, Grove and Simpson JJ, 3 March
1997 (alleged abuse between 1961 and 1967, abuse reported 1995)), and R v Dodds
[1996] QCA 402 (unreported, Fitzgerald P, Pincus JA and Lee J, 18 October 1996
(alleged abuse between 1984 and 1986, proceedings commenced in 1994)).
39 (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 555.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
352
With respect, it is suggested that society is best served by having
serious claims of abuse to be tested in court. If the allegations are in
fact true, it is in no-one’s interest that a person who has committed
sexual crimes, often against a child, remain in the community without
their behaviour being punished. What kind of message does this send
to the perpetrator, as well as the victim(s) of the abuse?
The concern above, that defendants need to be able to organize
their affairs with certainty and without stale claims hanging over
them, of course can have no relevance or application to a case where
abuse is alleged. No child abuser has a right to have the abuse for-
gotten about or denied. And while, in an ideal world, it may be in the
public interest to have matters resolved as soon as possible, in the real
world there are often very good reasons for a delay in bringing ac-
tion. There are good reasons why a survivor of child abuse might
never, if ever, report the abuse and why it might take many years for
the legal system to hear of the allegations. The victim might deny the
abuse as a self-preservation mechanism, or because they are suffering
from PTSD. The victim may well not realize that their difficulties are
caused by previous abuse. Why can the law not accommodate this
reality for survivors of sexual abuse?
It is submitted, with respect, that the Supreme Court of Canada has
taken the appropriate view in relation to these issues:
It is well documented that non-reporting, incomplete reporting and
delay in reporting are common in cases of sexual abuse . . . For victims
of sexual abuse to complain would take courage and emotional strength
in revealing those personal secrets, in opening old wounds. If proceed-
ings were to be stayed based solely on the passage of time between the
abuse and the charge, victims would be required to report incidents
before they were psychologically prepared for the consequences of that
reporting . . . Establishing a judicial statute of limitations would mean
that sexual abusers would be able to take advantage of the failure to
report which they themselves, in many cases, caused. This is not a result
which we should encourage. There is no place for an arbitrary rule.40
ii. How Concepts of Discoverability Have Been Applied by
the Courts
Many of the jurisdictions studied use the concept of ‘discoverability’
in different ways in relation to these issues. We need, first, to provide
examples of how this concept has been used in different jurisdictions,
40 R v L (W.K.) [1991] 1 SCR 1091; similarly Wilcox J in R v Lane (unreported, Federal
Court of Australia, Wilcox J, 19 June 1995), ‘it is commonplace for there to be a
substantial delay in the reporting of alleged sexual assaults, especially where the
complainant is a child . . . [M]any sexual assault victims are unable to voice their
experience for a very long time. To adopt a rule that delay simpliciter justifies a
stay of criminal proceedings would be to exclude many offences, particularly
offences against children, from the sanctions of the criminal law’; Owen J, ‘it is
not at all uncommon for there to be a delay in the institution of proceedings for
sexual offences’: R v Austin (1995) 14 WAR 484 at 493.
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before attempting a critique of this concept and whether it can be
improved at the level of principle or application. Of course, cases turn
on the specific provisions relevant to each case, so as each case is
discussed, the relevant statutory provision(s) are included.
(a) Australia41
SDW v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints42
The plaintiff was sexually assaulted by her stepfather between the
ages of 14 and 17. At this time, the plaintiff and her family were active
and practising members of the Mormon Church. The Church dis-
covered the abuse, and the offender was excommunicated from the
Church. No further action was taken. The abuse continued until the
41 There is a real divergence in the statutory approaches of different states in
relation to these issues. Of course, there is a need to be aware of the statutory
context in which particular cases have arisen. Briefly, Victoria (Limitation of
Actions Act 1958 (Vic), s. 27D), New South Wales (Limitation Act 1969 (NSW),
ss 50C and 50D) and Tasmania (Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), s. 5A) have largely
followed the recommendations of the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence (2002)
(Ipp Review) and have a three-year post-discoverability limitation period for
personal injury actions, together with an absolute limitation period of 12 years
(long-stop period).
The Review appeared to accept a submission that society could reasonably
expect parents and guardians and those who care for incapacitated persons to
take reasonable steps on behalf of their charges to initiate claims within the
general time limits imposed on others (at 95). An exception thus applies in New
South Wales and Victoria where the alleged offender is either the parent of the
survivor or otherwise in a close relationship with the child’s parent such that that
parent might be influenced not to bring an action on the child’s behalf, or if the
existence of the relationship might make it more unlikely that the child would
disclose what happened (NSW, s. 50E, Vic, s. 27I). Discoverability here depends
on the child’s parent or guardian, and will be the date on which the parent knew
or ought to have known the fact of the injury, the fact that the injury was caused
by the defendant, and that the injury was sufficiently serious to justify the
bringing of an action (NSW, s. 50D(1), Vic, s. 27F(1)). A child is not considered in
New South Wales, Victoria or Tasmania to be under a legal disability if he or she
was in the custody of a capable parent or guardian (NSW, s. 50F(2)(a), Vic, s.
27J(1)(a) and Tas, s. 26(6)). The effect of Victorian s. 5(1A) has been limited to
certain actions involving tobacco- and dust-related injuries; in other words, the
facts in Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442 would not attract the provisions of s.
5(1A) if the matter were heard today. 
In Western Australia there is a three-year uniform limitation period for
personal injury actions, with time commencing to run when the injury ‘accrues’,
or when the plaintiff becomes aware that they have sustained a ‘not insignificant
injury’ or at the first symptom of such injury. There is no long stop. Queensland,
South Australia and the Northern Territory did not adopt aspects of the Ipp
Review regarding limitation periods, and provide for a three-year limitation
period for personal injury actions once the survivor attains majority, with
discretion to extend based on argument that the facts relating to the injury were
not knowable until later (Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), ss 11 and 31);
though the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) requires that a notice of
claim be given within nine months of the day of the incident giving rise to the
injury, or within nine months of the first appearance of symptoms or within one
month of first seeing a legal practitioner about a claim, whichever is earlier; these
requirements are suspended until the claimant reaches majority (ss 9(3), 19).
[Continued on next page]
42 [2008] NSWSC 1249.
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plaintiff went to the police. At this stage, the offender was charged
and later convicted. He served a jail term for his offences. The plaintiff
claimed that as a result of the abuse she suffered serious psychiatric
disability. This action was against the Church for failing to tell police
about the abuse or to take more action than they in fact did. As the
events occurred in Queensland, the Queensland limitation period of
three years applied. Given the plaintiff’s age, she was at a disability
until March 1990, and so would have had until March 1993, according
to the general rules, to commence her action. (The court noted in the
case that both counsel had argued that the relevant limitation period
expired in 1996, but concluded that it suspected counsel were in
error.) She did not commence her action until 2004, and this was an
action for an extension of time, rather than a claim.
The plaintiff claimed that it was in 2003 when she received a record
of an interview with the offender where she discovered that the
Church was aware of what had happened to her. She claimed she
obtained legal advice in September of that year but it did not refer to a
claim against the Church. In January 2004 she was advised that she
might have a claim against the Church. As a result of this meeting, the
plaintiff said she became aware that her injuries were of a long-
standing nature and would cause her ongoing financial loss and suf-
fering in future. The court found that even if the events of 2003 were
‘material facts of a decisive character’43 and even if the 2004 summons
could count as commencing proceedings, she was still outside the
12-month extension period. The plaintiff admitted she was advised in
2002 that she had post-traumatic stress disorder, and the commence-
ment of her proceedings took place more than 12 months after this
time. It would also be difficult for her to prove that the Church was
negligent in not reporting the abuse to the police. As a result, the
claim was statute-barred.
Section 36 of the South Australian Act makes similar provision (with subsection
(1)(a) providing for a separate limitation period of three years from when a person
has knowledge of a latent injury: Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s. 36(1)(a);
see also Limitation Act 1981 (NT), s. 12). There is no long-stop period in these
three jurisdictions. In the Australian Capital Territory, there is a three-year period
(with no discoverability provision and no provision for extension); however, if the
personal injury consists of a disease or disorder, there is a three-year period after
discoverability, with no long stop: Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), ss 11 and 16B. These
provisions have been subject to trenchant criticism: see for example Ben
Mathews, ‘Queensland Government Actions to Compensate Survivors of
Institutional Abuse: A Critical and Comparative Evaluation’ (2004) 4(1) QUT Law
and Justice Journal 23 and ‘Assessing the Scope of the Post-Ipp “Close Associate”
Special Limitation Period for Child Abuse Cases’ (2004) 11 James Cook University
Law Review 63; Lisa Sarmas, ‘Mixed Messages on Sexual Assault and the Statute
of Limitations: Stingel v Clark, the Ipp Reforms and the Argument for Change’
[2008] Melbourne University Law Review 18.
43 The case was considered in terms of the Queensland limitations legislation,
relevant (brief) details of which appear above at n. 41.
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Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 2)44
The plaintiff commenced an action in 2003 for damages in relation to
sexual abuse at the hands of a foster father with whom the State of
Tasmania sent him to live in 1961 when he was 11. The plaintiff now
suffered from a psychiatric disorder caused by the abuse, and poss-
ibly other factors. The state conceded that the foster carer had abused
the plaintiff and that he suffered psychiatric injury as a result. How-
ever, the state raised the limitation period as a defence to the proceed-
ings. It argued that the plaintiff’s injuries were of a physical and
psychiatric nature and that they were suffered in 1961. It denied that
these could be an action for damages for psychiatric injury separate
from the action for damages for physical injury.
The plaintiff claimed that he did not experience any psychiatric
symptoms until 1996 when, by chance, he happened to see the foster
father who had abused him many years ago. His mental health deteri-
orated at that time, but he claimed that in 2002 he realized that he had
psychiatric problems and that they were linked to the sexual abuse.
The foster father the subject of the proceedings had died by the time
these proceedings were brought.
The court agreed with the state. It found that the plaintiff’s cause of
action, which included the right to claim for the physical and psy-
chiatric injuries suffered, arose in 1961 when the abuse occurred. No
new cause of action arose in relation to the plaintiff’s suffering of
psychiatric injury. In so deciding, the court refused to apply overseas
case law providing for ‘delayed discoverability’. The three-year limita-
tion period had well and truly run out.
Michael Brown v State of New South Wales45
Here the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by employees of
the Department of Community Services in 1977 when he was sent to a
departmental training school after committing offences. He com-
menced legal proceedings seeking damages in 2001, well outside the
limitation period stated in the Limitations Act 1969 (NSW), and sought
an order extending time to commence such proceedings. The trial
judge rejected the application in 2003. In 2007, the plaintiff sought to
appeal this rejection, and sought a further extension of time within
which to do so. One reason why the plaintiff did not appeal the 2003
decision was that he had been advised to pursue an equitable remedy
for the alleged wrongdoing, which he did. However, those proceed-
ings were thrown out in 2006.
In denying the extension of time in 2003, the trial judge referred to
medical reports detailing the dysfunctional nature of the applicant’s
44 [2008] TASSC 76. The Tasmanian limitations legislation, upon which this case was
decided, was the Limitations Act 1974 (Tas) which provided for a three-year
limitation period, as noted above in n. 41.
45 [2008] NSWCA 287. The relevant limitations legislation is that of New South
Wales, details of which are briefly noted above at n. 41.
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childhood prior to the detention order. This included his father threat-
ening to chop off his hand with an axe and domestic violence against
his mother. His father had been an alcoholic and had a volatile per-
sonality. The plaintiff had continued to offend after his release from
departmental care, and was sentenced to a seven-year jail term for
sexual assault. The plaintiff suffered some serious incidents while in
prison and had been diagnosed with depression. A psychiatrist’s re-
port concluded that it would be difficult to determine the extent to
which the plaintiff’s current disabilities could be attributed to the
abuse he allegedly suffered, and the extent to which it related to other
difficulties in the plaintiff’s life. The report also noted some inconsist-
encies in the plaintiff’s reporting of the alleged sexual assaults com-
mitted against him. The trial judge rejected the application to extend
time. On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Appeal rejected the
application for an extension of time to appeal this decision. A further
four years had been added to the already lengthy delay. The case
would substantially be a word against word case. The court also re-
jected suggestions that the action was one of breach of fiduciary duty
rather than a tort case.
Although the case ultimately turned on questions of a fair trial
rather than discoverability, at least at the Court of Appeal level, the
most recent example of these issues being examined is HWC v The
Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane.46 At the time of
writing (early 2010), this decision is on appeal from the Queensland
Court of Appeal to the High Court of Australia.
There the plaintiff alleged that one of his teachers had abused him
in the early 1980s. He commenced legal action in 2002 against the first
defendant which ran the school at which the abuse allegedly took
place. Actions were also commenced against other authorities which
were said to have taken some actions which allowed the teacher to
gain registration with the Queensland authorities. Part of the case
against the defendant was that it had been told by a principal of
another school that the teacher in question had been dismissed from
employment with them due to inappropriate physical behaviour with
students, yet they still went ahead and engaged him. The defendant
denied this.
Section 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) provided for a
general three-year limit on actions for negligence, trespass, nuisance
or breach of duty involving personal injury, the time running from the
date on which the cause of action arose. Section 31 of the Limitation
of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) provides that an extension may be available
46 [2009] QCA 168.
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from the date on which a material fact47 of a decisive character48
relating to the right of action came within the plaintiff’s means of
knowledge49 after the three-year period, if the claim otherwise is sup-
ported by evidence. In such cases, the limitation period will expire one
year after the fact came within the means of knowledge of the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff claimed he was not aware until 2001 that the abuse by
the teacher was having an ongoing effect on him, that the principal of
his school had apparently been warned by another principal of the
teacher’s proclivities, and that authorities in another state had become
aware of the teacher’s proclivities but allowed him to maintain his
registration as a teacher. There was evidence that in 1988, when the
plaintiff attended a lecture on sexual abuse as part of his medical
studies, he suffered adverse psychological symptoms. He began using
marijuana, and became depressed. He failed some of his exams, and
had problems with his personal relationships.
The trial judge allowed the matter to proceed, finding that there
was an explanation for the delay. Someone in the plaintiff’s position
would realize that by commencing an action they would have to re-
live the experience of the abuse. It was understandable that the plain-
tiff took no action in the late 1980s or 1990s because he was trying to
establish his career. The plaintiff was not aware at this time of the
extent to which the abuse had affected him. It had not been until 2002
when the plaintiff suffered a psychiatric condition that the effects of
the abuse on him had become apparent. A reasonable person would
not have enquired about the possibility of legal action until his symp-
toms became apparent. As a result, the judge found that there were
material facts of a decisive character not within the plaintiff’s means
of knowledge until 2002.
However, these findings were overturned by the Queensland Court
of Appeal. The court found that it would not be possible to have a fair
47 ‘Material fact’ is defined to include the fact of the occurrence of negligence,
trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded, the
identity of the person against whom the cause of action lies, the fact that the
negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty caused personal injury, the
nature and extent of the personal injury so caused, the extent to which the
personal injury is caused by the negligence, nuisance, trespass or breach of duty:
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s. 30(a)(i)–(v).
48 These facts are of a decisive character only if a reasonable person knowing those
facts and having taken the appropriate advice would regard the facts as showing
that a cause of action would have a reasonable prospect of success resulting in
damages, and that the person whose means of knowledge was in question should
in their own interests bring the action: s. 30(b)(i) and (ii). The facts must take on a
decisive character before the one-year period begins to run: Queensland v
Stephenson (2006) 227 ALR 17 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kirby JJ, Heydon
J dissenting).
49 This means that the person does not know the fact at the time, and as far as the
fact could be found out by the person, they have taken all reasonable steps to do
so: s. 30(c)(i) and (ii).
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trial of the plaintiff’s claims. The key conversation between the prin-
cipal of the ex-employer of the alleged perpetrator and the principal
of the school at which the abuse allegedly occurred took place almost
30 years ago, and not surprisingly, there were different recollections
of what was said. In respect of the other defendants, key personnel in
their organizations in relation to this case had died, compromising
their ability to defend themselves against the allegations.
Keane J of the Court of Appeal found that there were good reasons
for limitation periods, and agreed with comments of McHugh J in
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor that the general
three-year rule: 
. . . should prevail once the defendant has proved the fact or the real
possibility of significant prejudice. In such a situation, actual injustice to
one party must occur. It seems more in accord with the legislative policy
underlying limitation periods that the plaintiff’s lost right should not be
revived than that the defendant should have a spent liability reimposed
on it.50
Chesterman J agreed with comments by Keane J in another case
involving a lengthy time period between alleged events and a trial
when Keane J found that: 
. . . the court is not in the business of preserving the opportunity to
conduct solemn farces in which parties and witnesses are invited to
attempt to reconstruct recollections which have long since disappeared.
Such a trial would not be fair for either party.51
In two recent cases, extensions have been granted. In these cases, the
plaintiff was able to show that they were under a disability for many
years, the result of which was to stop the limitation period from
running against them.
In Saunders and Anor v Jackson52 the plaintiff alleged she had been
sexually and physically assaulted between 1978 and 1987 while a
minor. She turned 18 in April 1990. The alleged perpetrators were the
victim’s sister and her sister’s partner. The statement of claim was
filed in 2004. Under the relevant (as amended) Limitations Act 1969
(NSW) provision at the time, the limitation period would have expired
in April 1996, six years after she became an adult.53 She sought an
extension of time under provisions which suspended the running of
the limitation period while the claimant was under a ‘disability’. The
Act defined a disability to include situations where the person is inca-
pable or substantially impeded in the management of their affairs due
to any disease or impairment of his/her physical or mental condition.
50 (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553–5.
51 Para. 90; Keane J’s comments appeared in Page v The Central Queensland
University [2006] QCA 478.
52 [2009] NSWCA 192; the relevant New South Wales legislation is noted above at n.
41.
53 S. 14(1)(b) of the Act.
359
EXTENDING TIME LIMITS IN SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
The plaintiff’s family had strong connections with the police force,
her father being a senior officer as was her uncle. In 1992, she went to
the police station where her uncle was the officer in charge. She
reported the assaults to a female police officer. She was told not to
pursue the matter because it would take too long. Her mother asked
her not to press charges because of ‘family status’ and the damage it
would do to the family’s reputation. Her father was also suffering
illness at this time, and she was concerned that, if she pressed ahead
with the matter, it might exacerbate his illness.
In 1993, the plaintiff’s marriage broke down. She claimed it was due
to the assaults which caused her anger, led to her abusing alcohol,
and gave her flashbacks and nightmares. She had a child in 1995 from
a different relationship, but developed post-natal depression. In the
following year, she received counselling after attempting suicide. She
said at this time she was not in control of herself and not able to make
decisions about her life. She told someone at the hospital about the
abuse, but found them unhelpful. In 1998, the plaintiff had another
child. This child had serious health issues which did not improve until
2002. The plaintiff was very concerned for the child’s wellbeing at this
time and was stressed and anxious. The plaintiff was on anti-
depressants. In 2001 the plaintiff again tried to commit suicide, and
continued to suffer flashbacks and nightmares about the assaults. She
commenced counselling in 2002.
Later that year, she reported the abuse to police, but the police did
not take it any further. She sought legal advice in December 2002 and
regularly met with legal advisers until the claim was filed in 2004. The
plaintiff claimed it was not until 2002 that she felt physically and
emotionally well enough to pursue the sexual assault claim. Psychi-
atrists testified that the plaintiff’s mental state was likely to have been
caused by the earlier abuse and that it was consistent with post-
traumatic stress disorder.
The court was satisfied that the plaintiff had been suffering from a
disability over these years which prevented her from turning her
mind to the question of legal action over the assaults. She was not in a
position to manage her affairs. It was relevant that the assaults were
by a family member over many years in the context of a family with
considerable prestige in the community and distinguished police
service.54
54 In this finding, the case is somewhat similar to Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442,
where the court was satisfied that a plaintiff suffering post-traumatic stress
disorder could be suffering from a ‘disorder’ within the meaning of Victorian
legislation, justifying the delay in bringing proceedings. However, since this
decision, the Victorian Parliament has amended the legislation to exclude these
types of claims from that extension provision.
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Glennie v Glennie55
In March 2008, the plaintiff (28) commenced action against her father
and uncle claiming damages. It was alleged that the father had sexu-
ally assaulted the plaintiff and the uncle, a medical practitioner, had
been negligent in not reporting the abuse to the authorities. The plain-
tiff’s father had been jailed for the offences. The second defendant
claimed this action was statute-barred. The abuse took place over a
seven-year period from when the plaintiff was four. There was evid-
ence that the plaintiff’s mother knew of the abuse. The uncle was
called to the home and told of the abuse. He and the plaintiff’s mother
told the plaintiff not to be alone with the father again.
The plaintiff’s behaviour began to deteriorate at the time she com-
menced high school, after the abuse had occurred. She began to use
drugs including alcohol and would regularly truant; as a result, her
school marks dropped. After school she had a number of sexual part-
ners, one of whom introduced her to heroin. She became addicted
and eventually became a prostitute. She commenced criminal activity
such as robbery, stealing and drug offences. She was eventually ad-
mitted into a drug rehabilitation programme. When she was released,
she lived with her parents for some time, while working in a series of
low-paid jobs. She had a number of ‘one-night stands’ and became
pregnant. Her daughter was born in 2001. Her boyfriend urged her to
move out of her parents’ home. At her parents’ house while her father
held her three-month-old baby, she apparently had a realization that
her father could also abuse her daughter. She moved out of the house,
and told a departmental representative about her concerns.
Eventually in 2003, the plaintiff told the police about the abuse. Her
father was charged some months later. In 2006, he eventually pleaded
guilty after evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s allegations emerged.
Once this occurred, the plaintiff got legal advice about a possible civil
claim, and was referred to medical experts for diagnosis. Psychiatrists
testified that the abuse had affected the plaintiff throughout her life,
making it difficult for her to form and maintain relationships, contrib-
uting to her drug dependency as well as flashbacks of the abuse. She
did not have a clear self-identity and was prone to impulsive behavi-
our, as well as anger, irritability and anxiety. One psychiatrist said the
plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. One testified
that delay in bringing legal proceedings for this kind of injury was
explicable by the difficulties for victims in disclosing abuse.
The court was again satisfied that, due to the sexual abuse over a
long period, the plaintiff had suffered a disability within the meaning
of the Act, affecting her ability to make decisions about her life,
55 [2009] NSWSC 154. The relevant New South Wales limitation legislation is noted
above at n. 41.
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including the possibility of civil action against her father and uncle.56
She was during this time drug dependent, committing crimes, and
working as a prostitute. It was only after her father pleaded guilty that
she felt strong enough to take these proceedings. As a result, the
running of the limitation period was suspended until 2006, and this
proceeding could continue.
(b) England
Earlier limitations legislation made it difficult for claimants to seek
extensions of time within which to bring their case. Often the conclu-
sion was reached that the plaintiff’s claim should not proceed, al-
though the time within which to bring a claim may have run out
before the plaintiff was aware of the injury or damage they suffered.57
Various statutes of limitation have been passed over the years to try to
remedy this perceived anomaly (and others), often prompted by re-
ports of law reform agencies or criticism of some of the results of the
application of these rules in particular cases. However, examples of
limitation periods running out despite the plaintiff not having knowl-
edge continue, because cases to which older-style limitation periods
apply continue to be brought. A recent example is McDonnell (FC) v
Congregation of Christian Brothers.58 There the plaintiff claimed to
have suffered abuse between 1941 and 1947 at a school run by the
defendant. The court, applying the relevant 1939 legislation, found
that the time limit for the plaintiff’s claims expired six years after he
reached majority, in this case 1963. The fact that the plaintiff may not
have known that the abuse had affected him later in life was irrele-
vant. Lord Bingham, with whom other Law Lords in McDonnell
agreed, concluded that:
Sympathy for the possible injustice suffered by the appellant must be
tempered by recognition of the almost impossible task the respondents
face in seeking to resist a claim of this kind after the lapse of half a
century.59
The House of Lords’ decision in A v Hoare and Other Appeals60
changed significantly the law in England in relation to statutes of
limitation. The case involved various claimants who alleged abuse
56 At the time, the Limitations Act 1969 (NSW) provided for a general limitation
period of three years, subject to suspension during times when the plaintiff was
under a disability: ss 18A and 52.
57 This occurred in much-criticized decisions such as Cartledge v E. Jopling and
Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 where the House of Lords dismissed a claim brought
more than six years after the plaintiff had suffered damage, and despite the fact
that the plaintiff was not aware of this damage for many years afterwards. A
similar approach was taken in Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber
[1983] 2 AC 1.
58 [2003] UKHL 63.
59 Ibid. at para. 24; this parallels the concerns of the Queensland Court of Appeal in
the recent case of HWC v The Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane
[2009] QCA 168.
60 [2008] UKHL 6.
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occurring between 13 and 20 years earlier. The general limitation
period for this case was contained in the Limitations Act 1980, and
was six years from the date upon which the cause of action arose.
However, s. 11 of the Act provided for a special time limit for actions
for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty involving
personal injuries of three years from either the date when the cause of
action accrued or the date of knowledge, if later. The date of knowl-
edge was the date on which the person first had knowledge of various
facts including the significance of the injury. An injury was significant
if a reasonable person would have been justified in bringing legal
proceedings in relation to it.61 The Act provided that in assessing
whether the applicant knew their injury was significant, knowledge
included that which they might have been expected to know from
facts known to them, or knowable with the help of expert assistance
which could reasonably have been accessed by the applicant.62 In s. 11
cases, the court had discretion to extend the limitation period where
necessary.63 One relevant factor was the reason(s) for the delay in
bringing proceedings.
The House of Lords held that actions for damages for personal
injury for intentional trespass to the person fell within s. 11 of the Act,
and thus were actions for which an extension of time beyond the
typical limitation period could be brought. In so deciding, the House
overruled previous decisions such as Stubbings v Webb64 that had
found that an action for trespass was outside s. 11. In so doing, the
House of Lords result was consistent with the finding of the High
Court in Stingel v Clark, and Lord Hoffmann, with whose judgment
several other Law Lords expressly agreed,65 referred with approval
to the High Court decision in Stingel and its refusal to follow
61 Limitations Act 1980, s. 14(2).
62 Ibid., s. 14(3); the House of Lords has divided on the issue of whether the s. 14 test
should be applied objectively or subjectively: see for example Adams v Bracknell
Forest Borough Council [2004] UKHL 29, which will be discussed below. Other
cases in which the concept of discoverability was considered in detail include:
Forbes v Wandsworth Health Authority [1997] QB 402, CA; Nash v Eli Lilly and Co
[1993] 1 WLR 782, CA; Sniezek v Bundy (Letchworth) Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 212;
and Dobbie v Medway Health Authority [1994] EWCA Civ 13.
63 Limitations Act 1980, s. 33; the fact that some proceedings were commenced
within time (but for some reason were discontinued) does not preclude the
plaintiff bringing a later application to bring proceedings that would typically be
statute-barred, if the court is otherwise minded to exercise its discretion to allow
the claim to proceed: Horton v Sadler [2006] UKHL 27.
64 [1993] AC 498; in relation to this case, the European Court of Human Rights
suggested that rules on limitation of actions applied by member states might need
to be revisited to make special provision for claimants in sexual abuse cases, but
declined to substitute its view for that of state authorities on the appropriate
policy setting: [1997] 1 FLR 105.
65 A v Hoare [2008] UKHL: Lord Walker (at 53), Lord Carswell (at 62), and Lord
Brown (at 74). The case is discussed in more detail in T. Prime and G. Scanlan,
‘Limitation and Personal Injury in the House of Lords: Problem Solved?’ (2008)
Statute Law Review 29; A. McGee and G. Scanlan, ‘Judicial Attitudes to
Limitation’ (2005) 24 Civil Justice Quarterly 460; and Michael Jones, ‘Accidental
Harm, Intentional Harm and Limitation’ [1994] 110 Law Quarterly Review 31.
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Stubbings.66 As a result of the previous position in Stubbings, anom-
alies had arisen whereby the perpetrator of the abuse could not be
sued because the six-year period applicable to trespass had expired,
but the wife of the abuser could be sued in negligence because the
time limit of three years was extendable under s. 11. The Law Reform
Commission had recommended that no distinction be made between
claims in negligence and those in trespass.67
In relation to the question of abuse and the explanation it might
provide for extension of time, the court first considered the ‘date of
knowledge’ discussed in s. 11. Lord Hoffmann agreed with comments
by Lord Griffiths in Stubbings that he had ‘the greatest difficulty in
accepting a woman who knows she has been raped does not know
that she has suffered a significant injury’.68 He did consider, however,
the psychological impact of such abuse and whether it might explain
the delay in bringing proceedings under s. 33.69 Lord Hoffmann re-
ferred to the Law Reform Commission’s Final Report on its review of
limitation periods; the Commission had considered the introduction
of special rules regarding victims of sexual abuse, given that many
victims suffer from ‘dissociative amnesia’ where they block out trau-
matic events. The Commission said that such a condition could qualify
as a ‘disability’ within the Act, and eventually concluded that no spe-
cial rules should be introduced to deal with the psychological inca-
pacity sometimes suffered by survivors of sexual abuse due to
definitional problems.70
A majority of the House of Lords in A v Hoare favoured an ob-
jective approach to s. 14(2) and (3); in other words, the majority
found the personal characteristics of the individual plaintiff not to be
relevant in applying s. 14(3). Lord Hoffmann noted that the Law
66 A v Hoare [2008] UKHL [20]. Michael Jones favours the new approach: ‘It is not
obvious why medical malpractice claims should be subject to two different
limitation periods depending on whether the claim arises in negligence or
trespass to the person’: Jones, above n. 65 at 34.
67 The Law Commission, Limitation of Actions (2001) HC 23, p. 108. The author
agrees with this position, accepted by the court in Stingel and Hoare. It makes no
sense to have rules in this area that have the effect that the abuser cannot be sued
personally because the limitation period against them (relating to trespass) has
expired, yet another claim against someone much less culpable is live because
that claim might happen to be brought in negligence (i.e. the situation in S v W
[1995] 1 FLR 862). It would not further the objective of provisions such as s. 11 to
exclude trespass to the person matters from their ambit. In the past, it may have
been justified on the policy basis that a deliberate wrongdoer (trespasser) should
not have the advantage of the shorter limitation period applied to s. 11 cases;
however, now that there is discretion in s. 11 cases to extend the shorter period,
such policy argument no longer makes sense, if it ever did: this was noted by
Lord Hoffmann in A v Hoare, para. 14.
68 Lord Griffiths also noted the grave difficulty involved in investigating events
alleged to have occurred in a period starting over 30 years ago and ending over
20 years ago.
69 This section provides discretion for a court to extend the time within which a
claim should otherwise have been brought.
70 Law Commission, above n. 67 at 106.
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Commission had in its Final Report recommended that the test of
significance should be an objective one.71 As Lord Hoffmann put it:
The test itself is an entirely impersonal standard; not whether the claim-
ant himself would have considered the injury sufficiently serious to
justify proceedings but whether he would ‘reasonably’ have done so.
You ask what the plaintiff knew about the injury he had suffered, you
add any knowledge about the injury which may be imputed to him
under s. 14(3) and you then ask whether a reasonable person with that
knowledge would have considered the injury sufficiently serious to
justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who
did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment . . . I cannot
accept that one must consider whether someone with the plaintiff’s
intelligence would have been reasonable if he did not regard the injury
as sufficiently serious. That seems to me to destroy the effect of the word
‘reasonably’. Judges should not have to grapple with the notion of the
reasonable unintelligent person.72
In so doing, the House of Lords was following the approach taken in
Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council,73 where a majority of the
court applied a purely objective test to the question of when the
plaintiff could have been expected to seek expert advice about his
learning difficulties.
Lord Hoffmann concluded in A v Hoare that the court would con-
sider subjective aspects regarding the individual plaintiff, and why
they delayed bringing proceedings, in relation to the court’s discre-
tion to extend time under s. 33 of the 1980 Act.
71 Law Commission, above n. 67 at para. 3.24.
72 A v Hoare [2008] UKHL. Lords Walker, Carswell and Brown agreed. As Lord
Carswell put it, ‘the medical reports set out the ill-treatment [the claimant Young]
received, which was so severe that any reasonable person would have regarded it
as significant within the meaning of s. 14(2)’ (para. 69). It was irrelevant that the
plaintiff’s personal circumstances or characteristics might have led them not to
sue at the time (para. 68).
73 [2004] UKHL 29. For example: ‘in the absence of some special inhibiting factor,
I should have thought that Mr Adams could reasonably have been expected to
seek expert advice years ago. The congeries of symptoms which he described to
Dr Gardner, which he said had been making his life miserable for years, which he
knew to be rooted in his inability to read and write and about which he had
sought medical advice, would have made it almost irrational not to disclose what
he felt to be the root cause’ (Lord Hoffmann, para. 49) (with whom Lord Phillips,
Lord Scott and Lord Walker agreed). As Lord Scott said: ‘personal characteristics
such as shyness and embarrassment, which may have inhibited the claimant from
seeking advice about his illiteracy problems but which would not be expected to
have inhibited others with a like disability, should be left out of the equation . . .
My own, non-expert inclination would be to think that a person of average
intelligence who knew himself to be illiterate, knew that his illiteracy was at the
back of problems such as stress, depression etc and who consulted a doctor about
these problems, could reasonably be expected to inform the doctor about his
illiteracy’ (paras 71–2). This was similar to the approach taken in Forbes v
Wandsworth Health Authority [1997] QB 402, CA (Stuart-Smith and Evans LJJ;
Roch LJ taking a subjective approach). A contrary argument is made by Prime
and Scanlan: ‘with respect to Lord Hoffmann, the real issue is not what judges
find difficult or relatively straightforward to do, but what is the intention of
Parliament’: above n. 65.
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Baroness Hale acknowledged that the question of a fair trial was
relevant to the exercise of the discretion, but that it was possible to
have a fair trial long after the events in question, including fair trials
of criminal charges of historic sex abuse.74 She was in favour of
considering the plaintiff’s subjective attributes in applying s. 14(2)
and (3):
We are used in other contexts to looking at this particular person, with
all his personal characteristics and in the position in which he finds
himself, and asking what a reasonable person would expect of him . . .
Why then should we not look at this particular claimant, with all his
personal characteristics and in the situation in which he finds himself,
and ask whether a reasonable person would expect him to recognise
that his injury was sufficiently serious to justify making a claim against
someone who admitted it . . .75
In so doing, Baroness Hale was maintaining the position she took in
Adams, where she stated that the character and intelligence of the
plaintiff was relevant in applying s. 14 of the Act.76
(c) Canada
A different approach is evident in Canada, with the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in M (K) v M (H)77 a leading example. There the
applicant had been subject to sexual abuse by her father over several
years. Her father threatened her that if she disclosed the abuse, her
mother would commit suicide, the family would break up, no-one
would believe her, and he would kill her. Despite these threats, she
attempted on many occasions to report the abuse, but was referred to
different individuals and bodies. Attending a self-help group for in-
cest victims, she realized her psychological problems as an adult were
caused by the abuse, and that her father was to blame for what hap-
pened. She received psychiatric treatment, and the psychiatrist testi-
fied that the plaintiff would not have been able to connect the incest
with her later injuries until she realized she was not responsible. At
the age of 28 she commenced legal action against her father, alleging
breach of fiduciary duty and tort. A jury found that the father had
sexually abused his daughter; however, the trial judge ruled that the
74 [2008] UKHL 6 at para. [60].
75 Ibid. at para. 58; Baroness Hale suggested inconsistency in the position of the
majority here, claiming policy reasons why subjective considerations could not be
taken into account in applying s. 14(2) and (3), but then applying them in
considering s. 33 of the same Act (para. 60). However, she reached a similar
conclusion to that of the other judges on the facts.
76 Ibid. at para. 81; citing cases such as Nash v Eli Lilly and Co [1993] 1 WLR 782,
CA, where Purchas, Ralph Gibson and Mann LJJ had adopted a subjective test.
This was supported by the Law Commission in its 2001 Report: ‘we recommend
that the claimant should be considered to have constructive knowledge of the
relevant facts when the claimant in his or her circumstances and with his or her
abilities ought reasonably to have known of the relevant facts’ (para. 3.50). A
subjective approach was also favoured by Prime and Scanlan, above n. 65.
77 [1992] 3 SCR 6.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
366
tort action was statute-barred. There was no limitation period for
breach of fiduciary duty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the limitation period for
the tort claim did not commence to run until the plaintiff was reason-
ably capable of discovering the wrongful nature of the defendant’s
acts and the nexus between those acts and their injuries. The causal
link between fault and damage was an important fact, essential to the
formulation of the right of action. Here, that only occurred when the
plaintiff entered therapy. The court found that incest was a breach of
fiduciary duty owed by a parent to a child.
In relation to limitation periods, the court noted that they were
introduced because there was a time when a defendant should be
secure in their expectation that they will not be held to account for
ancient obligations. The court noted here that the argument was un-
persuasive in the context of claims of the nature described here. While
in some cases the cost of professional services could justify the im-
position of limits, here there was no public interest in protecting
incest offenders from the consequences. The court found that it would
be ‘patently inequitable’ to allow incest offenders to escape liability
while their victims continued to suffer the consequences. The court
noted further arguments in favour of limitation periods, that the
evidence might be stale. However, in many sexual abuse cases, the
evidence might be ‘stale’ in that there may be a long period between
when the abuse takes place and when the plaintiff obtains majority
and can legally sue. While cases of plaintiffs ‘sleeping on their rights’
also prompted limitation period arguments, again the argument was
not strong in this context.
The court accepted evidence from experts of the existence of ‘post-
incest syndrome’ where victims persistently avoided situations
(including lawsuits) likely to force them to recall and re-experience the
traumas. The condition impedes recognition by the victim of the
nature and extent of the injuries they suffered either because they
repress their memory of what happened, or because the memories are
too painful to confront. The court welcomed suggestions for law
reform in this area, most especially the abolition of limitation periods
for cases of incestuous sexual assault.
(d) United States
While the concept of delayed discoverability has been known to
United States courts since 1949,78 originally, the courts took a strict
approach to applications to extend time within which to bring a civil
legal claim regarding alleged abuse. For example, in Tyson v Tyson,
the plaintiff was in her mid-20s and alleged that her father abused her
while she was aged between 5 and 11. She argued that she had not
remembered the abuse until she underwent psychotherapy. The court
78 Urie v Thompson 337 US 163 (1949).
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refused the application to extend time to bring the claim based on the
lack of evidence of the alleged events and the plaintiff’s injuries.79
Similarly, in Lindabury v Lindabury, the plaintiff claimed abuse by
her father had occurred 20 years ago, which she only discovered
during therapy. In denying her claim, the court concluded that the
limitation period commenced to run when the last (alleged) abusive
act occurred.80
Commencing in 1989, states began to enact statutes reflecting the
concept of delayed discovery, usually meaning taking into account
when a survivor of abuse might reasonably have discovered that their
injuries or condition was caused by earlier abuse, and making the
limitation period run from then.81 This is now the position in most
states,82 with some states taking a more liberal view,83 and others
taking a stricter view.84 Unlike other jurisdictions, in the United States
limitation periods also apply to criminal proceedings, including those
involving alleged child abuse, and the period generally commences to
run when the crime is committed,85 including a limitation period for
the bringing of criminal charges in the current context.86
The application of the test, involving the concept of reasonableness
in relation to the delay in bringing proceedings, is contentious. For
example, in Roe v Archdiocese of St Paul and Minnesota,87 Roe began
79 727 P. 2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
80 552 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct App, 1989).
81 The term often used in the American literature is that the limitation period is
‘tolled’ until the date of reasonable discoverability. 
82 For example, Alaska (Alaska Stat. 9.10.140(b)(1)–(2)) (Supp. 1992) (within three
years of discovery), Arkansas (three years), California (three years), Colorado (six
years), Connecticut (17 years from majority), Florida (four years from discovery),
Idaho (within five years of majority), Iowa (four years after discovery), Kansas
(three years from discovery), Maine (six years from discovery), Minnesota (three
years from date reported to police), Missouri (three years from discovery),
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota (same), Vermont
(three years from discovery), and Virginia (ten years from discovery but long-stop
period of ten years): Ernsdorff and Loftus, above n. 34 at 145–6; Gary Hood, ‘The
Statute of Limitations Barriers in Civil Suits Brought by Adult Survivors of Child
Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution’ (1994) University of Illinois Law Review 417.
Unlike the other statutes mentioned, the Maine statute only applies where the
victim had repressed the earlier incident(s). 
83 There is no limitation period in Illinois, for example, for actions arising from
alleged child sex abuse: 735 ILCS 5/13–202.2 (Supp. 1993). Nevada courts have
effectively said the same thing, at least where the allegations are corroborated:
Petersen v Bruen 792 P. 2d 18 (Nevada, 1990).
84 Some jurisdictions stop the time from running only until the plaintiff knows or
ought reasonably to know of their injuries, whether or not they have linked them
to past abuse: DeRose v Carswell 242 Cal. Rptr 368 (Cal. Ct App 1987), Franke 209
Ill. App. 3d at 1009, 568 NE 2d at 931, 154 Ill. Dec. at 710.
85 Toussie v United States 397 US 112 at 114 (1970). Some states have legislated to
this effect (e.g. Connecticut, Delaware, New York, Hawaii and Texas), others
provide for an extension of the limitation period in criminal cases where abuse is
alleged (e.g. Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Mississippi).
86 For example, Hawaii has a three-year statute of limitation for criminal cases
involving rape of a child, regardless of the child’s age or ability to report the
crime.
87 518 NW 2d 629 (Minn. Ct App 1994) rev denied 24 August 1994.
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counselling sessions with the defendant priest, Father Piche, in
February 1982. Roe moved into the convent house next to the priest’s
church and by July that year, after Roe turned 18, the relationship
became sexual in nature. This sexual relationship ended in 1984. In
1985, Roe attempted to commit suicide. She later moved to Arizona
and married John Roe. She did not tell John about her relationship
with the Father, and did not think or talk about this relationship while
she was in Arizona. She moved back to Minnesota in 1988, and
shortly afterwards memories of her relationship with Father Piche
resurfaced. She again considered suicide, and commenced to self-
harm. In 1992, she watched a news programme addressing sexual
abuse by the clergy, and sought counselling. Her counsellor reported
that while Roe was in Arizona she had suppressed her memories of
the relationship with the Father, and it was only after seeing the
television programme that she was able to link her psychological
injuries to her relationship with Father Piche. She commenced action
later that year.
However, in finding the claim to be statute-barred because it was
brought more than six years from the date of discovery, the court
determined that Roe ‘should have’ causally connected her injuries to
the sexual abuse before she went to Arizona.88 The fact that she might
88 There was a similar result in Blackowiak v Kemp 546 NW 2d 1 (Minn. 1996) where
the plaintiff alleged he was abused by a school counsellor at age 11. The abuse
allegedly occurred in 1970, and the plaintiff had told a friend and his mother at
the time that something wrong was happening to him, but did not elaborate. The
plaintiff developed problems with truancy and drug abuse and saw various
counsellors but felt too ashamed to discuss his abuse. In 1991, he talked with an
ex-classmate who told him the school counsellor had abused him. It was only at
this time that the plaintiff said he felt comfortable talking about the abuse.
However, the court found that the statute of limitation had run on the claim. The
court relied on the fact that the plaintiff knew he was being abused from age 11;
they assumed he was aware of the effects of the abuse on him. The case is
discussed in detail in Anne Greenwood Brown, ‘Sometimes the Bad Guy Wins:
Minnesota’s Delayed Discovery Rule’ (1997) 23 William Mitchell Law Review 401.
Knowledge of the abuse was also critical in denying the plaintiff’s claim in Doe v
First United Methodist Church 629 NE 2d 402 (Ohio, 1994). Similarly, in ABC and
XYZ v The Archdiocese of St Paul and Minneapolis 513 NW 2d 482 (Minn. Ct App
1994) the court, in refusing the plaintiff’s application to extend time, stated that
the plaintiff ‘should have known that her relationship with the defendant was
abusive . . . it is unreasonable to suggest that ABC never realized the true nature
of this abusive relationship even though she had known the relationship was
wrong from the outset . . . To recognize a subjective standard and allow this case
to go to trial would open the floodgates to suits long since time-barred’ (at 487).
In E.J.M. v Archdiocese of Philadelphia 622 A.2d 1388 (Penn. 1993) in a similar
case where the plaintiff remembered the abuse but denied knowing its
implications, the court was similarly dismissive of the application to extend time:
‘inclusion of the plaintiff’s mental incapacity as a factor to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of [the] plaintiff’s diligence runs counter to the
reasonable person standard’ (at 1394).
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have suppressed memories of the abuse when she went to Arizona
was, therefore, irrelevant.89
Some courts have accepted the distinction drawn by psychologists
in childhood trauma cases of two ‘classes’ of abuse:
• Type I abuse, involving a single event. Typically, survivors of this
abuse have clear memories of the abuse but do not come for-
ward about it. They may not have connected the abuse with
their difficulties. 
• Type II abuse involves long-term or repeated abuse, often lead-
ing to the survivor completely or partially repressing their mem-
ory of the traumatic events until adulthood.90
Courts generally will not apply the delayed discovery rule in respect
of Type I cases. For example, in E.W. v D.C.H., the Montana Supreme
Court refused to extend the limitation period, because the plaintiff’s
knowledge of the abuse required them to investigate the cause:
To allow a [Type I] plaintiff, who fails to enquire into the cause of an
injury, to avoid the time bar under the guise of discovery would hope-
lessly demolish the protection afforded defendants by the statute.91
Type II claimants have often had better luck in seeking an extension of
time within which to bring their claim.92 This distinction between Type
89 The case, and the issues it raises, are discussed in some depth in Sandra Conroy,
‘The Delayed Discovery Rule and Roe v Archdiocese’ (1995) 13 Law and Inequality
253. On the other hand, some courts have been sensitive to the fact that a strict
application of the limitation period in sex abuse cases may force victims
prematurely to confront their abusers: see for example Peterson v Bruen 792 P.2d
18 (Nevada 1990).
90 Richardson, above n. 13 at 531–2.
91 754 P. 2d 817 at 820–1 (Mont. 1988) (plaintiff had sued at age 34, she had always
known her step-uncle abused her and suffered emotional and physical disorders
as a child but did not associate her problems with her prior abuse until she
underwent counselling in 1986; the limitation period was not extended because
the court found that she had sufficient knowledge at 18 and the fact that she did
not fully understand her legal rights or the impact of the abuse at that time was
not relevant); Bowser v Guttendorf 541 A. 2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct 1988); Hildebrand
v Hildebrand 736 F. Supp. 1512 at 1521 (1990); Messina v Bonner 813 F. Supp. 346
at 348–9 (ED Pa. 1993); E.J.M. v Archdiocese of Philadelphia 622 A. 2d 1388 at 1394
(Penn. 1993); Barren by Barren v United States 839 F. 2d 987 at 994 (3d Cir. 1988);
Clay v Kuhl 727 NE 2d 217 (Ill. 2000). However, in Ross v Garabedian 742 NE 2d
1046 (Mass. 2001), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed an
extension of time where the victim knew of the abuse but did not realize its
impact on him until many years later—victim was 13 at the time and was abused
by a 27-year-old; the court acknowledged that the victim knew what had
happened was ‘wrong’ but accepted his claim that he could not recognize the link
between the abuse and the plaintiff’s psychological injuries until he entered
therapy.
92 Johnson v Johnson 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D III, 1988); Ault v Jasko 637 NE 2d 870
(Ohio, 1994): the plaintiff was able to bring a claim at age 29 based on alleged
abuse at age 12 on the basis that she had repressed all memory of the events for
17 years. The court concluded that to deny the plaintiff’s opportunity to have the
case heard that she was ‘unaware existed until after the expiration of the statute
of limitations would be a greater injustice than the defendant’s burden in having
to defend against such a claim’ (at 872–3); Mary D v John D 264 Cal. Rptr 633 (Ct
App, 1989).
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I and Type II cases is often criticized as being arbitrary.93 In relation to
so-called Type III cases—which are all cases other than those in the
other types, so would deal with cases where the survivor did not
suppress memories of the events and was aware of the causal link
between the abuse and difficulties for the victim later in life—the
courts are typically unsympathetic to extension of time claims. For
example, in O’Neal v Division of Family Services, the plaintiff sued the
Division which had placed him in foster care when he was younger.
He sued the Division in 1986, claiming that a foster parent abused him
in 1973 and 1974. He conceded that he was aware of the abuse and its
consequences, but argued that he was not psychologically able to
reveal the abuse until 1986. The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the
case, finding that the plaintiff’s inaction explained the failure to bring
suit.94
(e) New Zealand
The New Zealand Court of Appeal considered these issues in S v G.95
There G alleged that she had been sexually, physically and emotionally
abused by S while they were members of a community. The abuse was
alleged to have occurred when G was aged from 14 to 16. S was
convicted in 1992 for these offences. G claimed breaches of fiduciary
duty and negligence against S in a civil claim. G claimed that it was in
the course of counselling therapy in 1990 that she recognized that the
emotional and psychological damage from which she was suffering
was caused by S’s conduct, and that the limitation period should only
commence to run from that time.
The court agreed, applying the principle of ‘reasonable discover-
ability’96 of the link between psychological and emotional harm and
past sexual abuse. A victim who reasonably had not linked serious
psychological and emotional damage to the abuse should not have the
limitation period run merely because of awareness of symptoms of the
abuse. It was only when the psychological damage was or should
reasonably have been identified and linked to the abuse that it could
be said that the elements of negligence were known and the cause of
93 E.g. Hood, above n. 82 at 418; Gregory Gordon, ‘Adult Survivors of Childhood
Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limitations: The Need for Consistent Application
of the Delayed Discovery Rule’ (1993) 20 Pepperdine Law Review 1359 at 1398;
Chrissie Garza, ‘Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse Seeking
Compensation from their Abusers: Are Illinois Courts Fairly Applying the
Discovery Rule to all Victims?’ (2003) 23 Northern Illinois University Law Review
317 at 321.
94 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991).
95 [1995] 3 NZLR 681.
96 This concept had arisen in building negligence cases where some time had
elapsed between the existence of latent defects and the plaintiff’s means of
knowledge of their existence. Initially the courts had found that time began to run
against the defendant as soon as the damage occurred (Cartledge v E Jopling and
Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758); eventually it was held that the time began to run only
when the damage was discovered or discoverable: Invercargill City Council v
Hamlin [1996] AC 624, PC.
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action accrued. There was good reason for the delay in bringing
proceedings, and the conduct itself must be assumed to have contrib-
uted to the delay. In the alternative, provisions of the limitations legis-
lation provided for a delay in the commencement of the limitation
period during any time where the cause of action might have been
concealed by fraud.
Subsequently in 2007, the Supreme Court of New Zealand dis-
carded the concept of ‘reasonable discoverability’ as a doctrine of
general application in limitations arguments.97 The doctrine arose in
the context of latent defects in building structures and was not in-
tended to, and should not have been, extended to apply to other
situations, including those involving sexual abuse. It had been used in
Hamlin in the context of assessing when damage occurred, rather
than when a limitation period began to run, as occurred in S v G.
The Supreme Court would not overrule S v G and similar cases, but
chose not to extend them to other fields in which limitations issues
arose. It noted that as a result of legislative amendment, a plaintiff in
the position of the one in S v G would be able to proceed with the
claim, perhaps reducing the need for a ‘reasonable discoverability’
gloss on the statute. The court also expressed its preference for seeing
such cases as involving a breach of fiduciary duty. It found that in
such cases, the cause of action would not accrue until the link between
the wrongdoer’s conduct and the plaintiff’s damage was known or is
known to the plaintiff.
IV. Critique of Current Positions and Consideration of
Solutions
Having set out the course that the law in this area has taken in various
jurisdictions, we can now turn to a critique of aspects of the current
orthodoxy, before proposing the ‘best way’ forward in terms of law
reform in this area. Of course, in making comments, care must be
taken to acknowledge the content of specific provisions that exist in
various jurisdictions, since there are important differences in wording
in different limitations statutes. Care must be taken when discussing
cases and their possible significance for other jurisdictions for this
reason. There have also been substantial amendments made to legisla-
tion in this area, as well as substantial work by Law Reform Commis-
sions, which should be taken into account.
It is accepted that no solution to the identified problem will be
perfect; inevitably there will be compromise, and it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to develop rules that will deliver what most consider
to be ‘fair’ outcomes in all cases. There is a delicate balance between
the very important public interest, as well as the very strong personal
97 Murray v Morel and Co Ltd [2007] 3 NZLR 721, per Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath
and Henry JJ, Gaunt J dissenting.
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interest of the one making the allegations, that such allegations of
abuse be heard in court and tested; on the other hand, the fact that
every defendant is entitled to a fair trial, and that where a long time
has passed between when a case is brought and when the facts under-
lying the case were alleged to have taken place, the task of running a
trial that is ‘fair’ becomes more difficult.
i. Are Judges in a Position to Judge When Injuries Were
‘Discoverable’?
As Mosher has pointed out, the reality for many survivors of sexual
abuse is that they have ‘discovered’ all aspects of their cause of action,
yet may not be able to bring a claim. This might be because they are
ashamed about what happened, reluctant to make the events public
for fear of hurting others, or not be prepared to re-live the terror of
what happened.98 If the discoverability rule is applied, time may well
have run out before the survivor is ‘ready’ to bring the matters to
court. As Mosher says, the problem is that ‘the assessment of reason-
ableness is made from the position of someone other than a survivor
of incest’.99 This comment is applicable to the range of jurisdictions
considered in this paper. Most recently, the House of Lords in A v
Hoare re-affirmed that an objective test must be applied in this con-
text, discounting the individual circumstances of the plaintiff, and
arguably inconsistent with the psychological literature in this area to
which reference was earlier made.
There are many possible case examples that could be used to make
this point. They include Roe v Archdiocese of St Paul and Minnesota,
where the court found that the survivor ‘should have’ connected her
injuries to the alleged abuse earlier than she in fact did.100 The House
of Lords most recently found in A v Hoare that the victim who had
allegedly been abused while in a detention centre many years ago
‘was obviously aware that he had been seriously assaulted’ and found
that it was very difficult to ‘accept that a woman who knows she has
been raped does not know she has suffered a significant injury’.101
Further, in Adams the House of Lords rejected the plaintiff’s claims
that the reason for the delay in bringing proceedings was because he
wanted to hide his difficulties, did not want others to think badly of
him, and in terms of his ongoing problems, he ‘didn’t want to go
there’. The House concluded that he should have sought advice and
assistance many years before he in fact did so.
98 Mosher, above n. 23 at 203.
99 Ibid. at 209.
100 518 NW 2d 629 (Minn. Ct App 1994); and in E.W. v D.C.H. 754 P. 2d 817 at 820–1
(Mont. 1988) the court concluded that the survivor ‘should have’ investigated the
cause of her psychological injuries, as did the court in O’Neal v Division of Family
Services 821 P. 2d 1139 (Utah 1991).
101 A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6, paras 40, 43 (Lord Hoffmann).
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The case I have chosen to best make the point, however, is the
Australian decision in Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of
the Diocese of Rockhampton.102 There the applicant was placed by the
government in a church-run orphanage soon after birth. Between
1961 and 1972 she suffered physical and emotional abuse by some of
the nuns who ran the orphanage. She allegedly endured daily rape
by an orphanage employee from the age of 7. In 1968 she complained
to the government about the abuse, but apparently nothing was done
and she was punished for complaining. She fled the orphanage at age
15 and lived on the streets.
Her life since that time had been a very difficult one, including the
death of her first child, a marriage characterized by verbal and emo-
tional abuse, and dependency on alcohol. In 1997, she learned of
others who suffered abuse at the orphanage. She went to the police
and sought legal advice. Her lawyers offered to investigate a civil
claim. Those who ran the orphanage apologized for the events and
settled the claim with the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought an extension of
time to bring a claim against the government that had placed her in
the orphanage. The government did not admit the abuse occurred and
claimed that relevant witnesses were either dead, very old or could
not be found. According to the standard limitation rules, the plaintiff
had until 1981 to bring proceedings (three years after turning 18). She
commenced proceedings in negligence and trespass in 1998, 17 years
after the time limit. She claimed it was only in October 1998 when she
read a psychiatrist’s report dated 29 September 1998 that she found
out she was suffering from PTSD, and fully appreciated the causal link
between the abuse and her condition. She claimed that although she
had obtained psychiatric and psychological treatment for many years,
she did not link the abuse to her condition until 1998.
By a majority of 2–1, the Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed the
application for extension of time. McPherson JA pointed to the claim-
ant’s statements that she was ‘depressed’, indicating an awareness
many years prior to the 1998 report that she suffered mental health
issues. In her statement, the plaintiff also acknowledged that because
of the abuse she suffered, she became an aggressive and angry per-
son, and would assault other children. McPherson JA used this to
conclude that ‘even at an early stage of her life, she was able to make a
connection between her treatment at [the orphanage] and her mental
state or behavioural condition’.103
The majority judges go on to ‘judge’ the plaintiff’s actions in seek-
ing redress, and her ability to link the abuse with her later difficulties.
A negative view was taken of her efforts in this regard:
102 [2001] QCA 335 (unreported, McPherson JA, Muir and Atkinson JJ, 24 August
2001).
103 Ibid. at para. [15]; and to like effect Muir J, para. [27].
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If later in her life she did not appreciate that there was a connection
between her childhood treatment and the alcoholism and her chronic
depression, [these were facts] which she could have found out by taking
the reasonable step of asking any psychiatrist whom she consulted. She
was aware of her need to consult psychiatrists and psychologists be-
cause she had done so evidently more than once before [in] August
1998. It is true that she says that, before then, there was never any
mention of a connection between the abuse suffered and her current
condition; but it would have been a reasonable step for her on the
occasion of those consultations for her to ask what caused her recurring
states of depression.104
However, as others have pointed out, it was not until the late 1980s
that medical specialists knew of the link between child abuse and
mental health issues later in life such as PTSD.105 It is unrealistic to
expect a victim to have made the link when experts themselves did not
do so for many years.
Further, as we know now, typical responses to trauma such as
the abuse the plaintiff suffered over many years is to block out the
events, and to avoid events or situations that would cause the plaintiff
to re-live the abuse.106 In this context, it is perfectly understandable
that a plaintiff might have forgotten about the abuse for many years,
making it difficult for them over a long period of time to connect their
current mental difficulties with past abuse. Further, as we know now,
some victims of such abuse enter into a ‘dissociative state’ as a sur-
vival mechanism against the abuse; this reaction can also lead the
victim not to remember the abuse for many years. Again, this should
not be held against them in terms of a ‘timely response’ when they
eventually do remember the abuse. There may also be other ‘systemic’
reasons for the plaintiff’s not coming forward earlier, including: (a) a
lack of awareness of health and counselling services available; (b) a
lack of awareness of a potential legal claim; or (c) lack of funds to
bring a legal action (in some cases). In cases dealing with a person
sent to an orphanage at a very young age, family support networks
104 Ibid. at para. [15].
105 Ben Mathews, ‘Judicial Considerations of Reasonable Conduct by Survivors of
Child Sexual Abuse’ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 631 at
651.
106 McGill J acknowledges this in Hopkins v Queensland [2004] QDC 21 (unreported,
McGill J, 24 February 2004), but claims that ‘the effect of the reluctance to talk or
think about the events is not accommodated by the extension provision; the
provision is not concerned with the situation where an applicant who was in
possession of the important facts simply did not want to pursue the matter, for
whatever reason. I do not think that the situation is changed by the fact that the
desire not to pursue the issue is in a sense caused by the psychiatric injury itself
. . . any understandable reluctance of the plaintiff to pursue this matter earlier
because of her psychiatric state is not a factor which can be taken into account’
(at 41–2).
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might also not be available, or not to the same extent as one might
otherwise expect.107
Further, the author finds an inherent difficulty in a judge making a
judgment about the ‘reasonableness’ of the plaintiff asking or not
asking about the reasons for her recurring depression, and a
finding that the plaintiff in such a case should ‘reasonably’ have made
enquiries.108 It is conceded that the concept of ‘reasonableness’ is
inherent in our legal system, and its usefulness in negligence law and
criminal law generally is not questioned here. However, its value in
cases of the type that are the focus of this paper is questioned.
The judge in such a case has (presumably) not been in the position
of a victim of long-term abuse as a child; it is very difficult to expect a
judge to pass judgment on the ‘reasonableness’ of the behaviour of
the survivor. The paper has referred earlier to a large amount of
psychiatric literature on child sexual abuse, including the multitude
of reasons why a victim might not disclose the abuse for many years,
and the variables that affect this. It is, in the author’s view, dangerous
for anyone to pass judgment on the ‘reasonableness’ of the response
of a child abuse survivor when they are not informed by this literat-
ure. Of course, this is not a problem confined to cases of child sexual
abuse. There are many cases and situations where a judge cannot be
expected to have first-hand knowledge or experience of the facts rel-
evant to the case. However, it is expected that where there is expert
knowledge in a field, judgments would be informed by such knowl-
edge rather than made in ignorance of it. Referring to Carter and
other cases, Mathews similarly concludes:
None of the judgments in the case studies discusses the symptomato-
logy of PTSD, or the avoidance criterion, in detail. The judicial deter-
minations of what is reasonable for a survivor of child abuse with PTSD
are either uninformed by psychological evidence, or are inadequately
informed, with insufficient examination of the psychiatric literature and
of the psychiatric reports presented in the case.109
While many jurisdictions do currently look to the question of the
107 Indeed, the Forde Inquiry (1999) (see text at n. 21 above) found that in many cases,
those sent to orphanages or children’s facilities were not encouraged to maintain
relations with other family members (at 78).
108 This difficulty led to the Australian Plaintiff Lawyers’ Association, in its
submission to the Queensland Law Reform Commission’s Review of the Limitation
of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), suggesting that the test refer to the plaintiff’s actual
knowledge (at 82). The New Zealand Law Commission also noted that the
reasonable person standard could work injustice if it was not related to the health,
intelligence and social competence of the particular claimant: New Zealand Law
Commission, Report No 6: Limitation Defences in Civil Proceedings (1988) 72.
Other Law Reform Commissions favoured a combined approach, asking what the
plaintiff would have discovered had they acted reasonably (Law Commission
Consultation Paper 151: Limitation of Actions (1997); Law Reform Commission of
Western Australia, Project No 36 Part II: Report on Limitation and Notice of
Actions (1997) 141). This was also the approach recommended by the Queensland
Law Reform Commission in its Report (at 90).
109 See Mathews, above n. 105 at 661.
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‘reasonableness’ of the delay in bringing proceedings and what the
survivor should or should not have done, the author submits that
the rules applicable to limitation periods in cases of alleged child
sexual abuse should not embrace this concept because of the diffi-
culties in its implementation, and the invitation it provides to judges to
pass judgment on the survivor’s response, often (with respect) in a
way not informed by relevant psychological literature.
ii. Discoverability is a Useful Concept
However, the above discussion should not be taken to be a criticism of
the concept of ‘discoverability’ at the level of principle, but more as
criticism of its application in some cases. The author agrees with the
use of this concept to delay the running of the limitation period as
occurred in cases such as Stingel, S v G, M v M and A v Hoare. Fixing
on the date of discoverability as the date upon which the limitation
period commences to run was also favoured in the Ipp Review.110
In this light, the decision of the Tasmanian Supreme Court in Tusyn
seems, at the very least, anomalous. The plaintiff commenced pro-
ceedings in 2003 in relation to abuse which occurred in 1961. He
claimed, and it was not in dispute, that he only learned he suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder in 2002. This was surely a material
fact of a decisive character of which the plaintiff was unaware until
shortly prior to the instigation of proceedings. The Supreme Court
did not even refer to Stingel v Clark when one would have thought
that comments in the case were highly relevant to the present pro-
ceedings. The court seemed to think that discoverability was a con-
cept confined to Canada and New Zealand. It is submitted to be unfair
for the court in Tusyn to conclude that the plaintiff’s ‘only causes of
action in respect of which he could claim damages for that psychiatric
injury are ones that accrued to him in 1961’111 when according to the
undisputed evidence the plaintiff did not know about his psychiatric
injury until 2002. As the Ipp Review concluded, in terms highly relev-
ant to the Tusyn litigation, ‘it would be unjust to provide for limitation
periods to run before claimants have suffered damage or know they
have suffered damage’.112
It is also submitted that, in applying the ‘discoverability’ principle,
the legal advice given to the plaintiff is relevant. This is most clearly
demonstrated in SDW v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
where the plaintiff commenced action in 2004 against the Church for
abuse she suffered from her stepfather. The family had been active
practising members of the Church, and once the abuse came to light,
the Church excommunicated the offender but took no further action.
The limitation period for the plaintiff would have run out in 1993 but
110 Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence (2002) 90.
111 [2008] TASSC 76 at para. [25] (Blow J, 26 November 2008).
112 Ipp Review at 88.
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the plaintiff claimed she only discovered the extent of her injuries and
its links with the abuse in 2002, but did not know until 2003 that the
Church knew of the abuse, and, although she obtained legal advice in
2003, was not advised until 2004 that she may have a claim against the
Church. She commenced action within 12 months of receiving this
advice, yet was deemed to be out of time because the action was
commenced more than 12 months after she discovered she had
PTSD.
However, it could be argued that the knowledge that she may have
a claim against the Church was a material fact of a decisive charac-
ter,113 and she only discovered this in 2004. She commenced proceed-
ings within 12 months of this knowledge, so arguably the extension
should have been allowed. The Ipp Review recommended that the
limitation period should commence to run on the date of discover-
ability, defined as the date on which the plaintiff knew, or ought to
have known, that personal injury had occurred, was attributable to
negligent conduct of the defendant, and was sufficiently significant
to warrant the bringing of proceedings. That Review recommended
that the three-year limitation period should run from when the plaint-
iff knew or ought to have known these things. In SDW, the court
heard that the plaintiff only discovered that she might have a claim
against the Church in 2004, and commenced proceedings that same
year. In this case, it is submitted that, consistently with the findings in
the Ipp Review, the limitation period should only have commenced
to run against that plaintiff in January 2004 when she obtained the
advice that the Church might be liable.
We see in this case also some anomalies with the provision of legal
advice—although she had legal advice in September 2003, it appar-
ently did not refer to the possibility of a claim against the Church; only
the advice in January 2004 did so. Further, as the court noted in the
case, both counsel appeared to be in error as to the deadline within
which the claim should have been brought.114 If, in fact, there were
errors and omissions in relation to the provision of legal advice115 to a
plaintiff in particular cases that might explain the delay, this should be
taken into account in the exercise of discretion. The result of the
errors should not be that the plaintiff loses the chance to have their
day in court and their allegations tested.
113 The definition of ‘material fact’ in the Queensland legislation applicable in this
case includes ‘the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies’. 
114 [2008] NSWSC 1249 at para. [17].
115 Similarly in Michael Brown v State of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 287, one
of the reasons for the failure to appeal a decision in a timely manner was that the
plaintiff had been advised to pursue an equitable claim instead. This claim was not
successful. Equitable claims arising from alleged abuse (sometimes framed in
equity in order to avoid otherwise unfavourable limitation period rules) had been
accepted in Canada but the existence of such a path in Australia was and remains,
at best, highly contentious on existing authorities. 
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iii. Reliance on Fiduciary Duties is Inadequate
As discussed above, some jurisdictions, in particular Canada and New
Zealand, consider such claims as involving, either alone or in conjunc-
tion with other legal doctrines, an alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
Partly, this might be because limitations statutes typically have no
limitation period, or a limitation period greater than the one applic-
able in tort, for such claims. Is this the preferred option for dealing
with cases of child sexual abuse?
The author submits that the answer to this question is ‘no’. Reliance
on the principle of breach of fiduciary duty inevitably gives rise to the
further question of which categories of relationship will be recognized
as those in which fiduciary obligations are owed. These categories are
open and subject to debate and argument.116 The argument might be
strong in the context where the abuser is a school teacher, for
example, and is also strong in cases where the abuser is a parent of
the victim. However, the argument starts to become strained where
the abuser’s relationship with the victim is more remote, for example
an uncle of the victim, or a neighbour.
The author is not in favour of what could well amount to an arbit-
rary distinction. It would not be right, in the author’s view, that a
longer limitation period apply, for example, in cases where the abuser
is the victim’s father, than in cases where the abuser was the neigh-
bour of the victim, yet these are the distinctions that may well
eventuate if we rely on the doctrine of breach of fiduciary obligation
to allow victims to proceed outside regular (tort) limitation periods.
iv. Should Limitation Periods Run While the Survivor is a Minor?
The typical position is that the limitation period does not commence to
run while the plaintiff is under a disability, and that being under the
age of 18 typically qualifies as a disability. In other words, subject to
any other extensions that might be available, the limitation period will
commence to run once the plaintiff attains majority.117
However, the position was changed in some Australian states fol-
lowing the Ipp Review. The Review seemed to accept the submission
that:
116 LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd [1989] 2 SCR 574 at 597
(Sopinka J). In that case, Sopinka J identified three important factors in
establishing the existence of a fiduciary relationship, including whether the
claimed fiduciary has scope for the exercise of power, whether in so doing they
can affect the beneficiary’s interests, and whether the beneficiary is peculiarly
vulnerable to the fiduciary’s exercise of power. Some courts have found that
fiduciary obligations do not apply in cases where a guardian has assaulted their
ward because the claims were not economic in nature and adequately dealt with
by tort law: Paramasivam v Flynn (1998) 90 FCR 489 at 507–8; Cubillo v
Commonwealth (2001) 182 ALR 249.
117 E.g. Limitation Act 1980 (UK), s. 28; Limitation Act 1950 (NZ), s. 24; this is also the
position in parts of Australia (Queensland, South Australia and the Northern
Territory, see n. 41), and is typically the position in the United States statutes: see
Garza, above n. 93 at 320.
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Society can reasonably expect parents and guardians, and those who
care for incapacitated persons, to take necessary steps on behalf of their
charges to initiate claims within the time limits imposed on the rest of
the community.118
It concluded that it was in the community interest that the limitation
period should run against minors provided the minor was in the
custody of a parent or guardian.119 The time would commence to run
when the parent or guardian knew or ought to have known of the
injury, the fact that it was caused by the defendant, and it was suffi-
ciently serious to justify legal action. The only exception would be
cases where the defendant was the parent or was in a close relation-
ship with the parent such that the parent or guardian may be influ-
enced by the potential defendant not to bring a claim, or the minor
might be unwilling to disclose the nature of the actions causing the
damage. It favoured special rules in such cases.120
In its Limitation of Actions Report, the Law Commission also con-
sidered this reform. However, it concluded differently:
A majority of consultees responding on this issue were of the opinion
that time should not run against a minor even though there is a repres-
entative adult, so that the interests of the minor are fully protected.
There was concern that if time was to run, the minor would inevitably
suffer, as appears to have been the case when a ‘representative’ adult
provision was included in the Limitation Act 1939. Wherever the minor
has a representative adult who is conscious of his or her responsibilities,
and willing and able to take action, it is likely that proceedings will be
issued on behalf of the child promptly even under the current law. The
only practical effect of providing that time runs where there is a repres-
entative adult would be to penalise those minors where the represent-
ative adult is negligent. We therefore do not recommend any rule to the
effect that time should run against a minor where there is a representat-
ive adult.121
It is submitted that the view of the Law Commission is the better
one.122 It is not considered to be sound policy to in effect penalize
minors where the representative adult is negligent. The action is, after
all, one belonging to the minor rather than their representative. Why
should the question whether a person’s claim remains alive or not
depend on what their parent or guardian did or did not do? There
118 Ipp Review at 95.
119 If the minor was not in the custody of a parent or guardian, or was in the custody
of the parent or guardian but that parent or guardian was under a disability, or
was in the custody of incapacitated persons for whom an administrator had been
appointed, that minor would be regarded as being under a disability, and the
limitation period would not run during this time.
120 Ipp Review at 96; the limitation period would only commence once the plaintiff
turned 25 and it would run for three years either from then or the date of
discoverability, at the court’s discretion.
121 See Law Commission, above n. 67 at 73.
122 Other critiques of the Ipp reforms in this context appear in: Sarmas, above n. 41;
Mathews, above n. 63.
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may be other factors explaining the failure of the parent or guardian
to take action. They may not be in a financial position to do so; they
may not believe the allegations made; and they may not want shame
or embarrassment being brought on the family. The survivor may not
at that time want the claim to be brought due to the feelings of shame
or because they do not want to go through the legal process, for
reasons explained earlier in this paper. None of these reasons reflects
badly on the survivor, and none of them relates to the claimed ration-
ale for enforcement of limitation periods. The position of other juris-
dictions on this issue is to be preferred to that of the jurisdictions
which have abolished this rule.
v. Disability Exception
One of the ways that some courts have found to ‘get around’ the
problem that a child sexual abuse survivor may otherwise be barred
by the statute of limitation in bringing a claim is to argue that the
survivor was under a disability. Commonly, in statutes of limitations,
the time within which an action must be brought does not run during
periods when the plaintiff was under a ‘disability’. Since a common
consequence of sexual abuse is that the survivor develops PTSD, as
described above, it may be argued that PTSD is a disability which
would operate to suspend the operation of the statute of limitation.
There is precedent confirming that PTSD is a disability within the
meaning of the limitations legislation.123 The High Court of Australia
was satisfied in Stingel v Clark124 that PTSD was a ‘disorder’ with the
effect that it suspended the relevant limitation period; there is no
reason to think the court would not find PTSD to be a ‘disability’
within the meaning of other statutes of limitations, and time would
not run accordingly. The Law Commission concluded that in cases
where plaintiffs suffer from what it termed ‘dissociative amnesia’,125
the plaintiff would be under a disability while this continued.126
If the courts accept that a person suffering PTSD is under a disabil-
ity within the meaning of the limitations legislation, it will be critical to
identify the precise period for which the disability will be deemed to
have lasted. Does this disability commence when the traumatic events
123 S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 at 462–3.
124 (2006) 226 CLR 442, although subsequently the legislation was amended by the
Victorian Parliament in such a way as to remove sexual abuse claims from the
category of cases in which an extension under s. 5(1A) of the Act is allowed.
These were confined to dust- and tobacco-related injuries.
125 The Commission referred to two different possible meanings of this concept:
(a) an inability to recall personal information of a stressful and traumatic nature,
such as sexual abuse; and (b) a situation where the plaintiff is aware of both the
trauma and the consequences for their psychological makeup, but the trauma was
so bad and memories and reminders of it too psychologically damaging for the
plaintiff, leading the plaintiff to dissociate themselves from memory triggers,
including litigation (above n. 67 at 106).
126 Law Commission, above n. 67 at 106.
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occur? Or, as members of the High Court claimed in Stingel,127 does
the disability commence when the symptoms of PTSD manifest them-
selves?128 If this is accepted in subsequent cases, it may be difficult to
pinpoint the precise time at which the limitation period stops running.
Presumably the symptoms of PTSD typically manifest themselves at a
time prior to any counselling that the survivor receives. That is why
the survivor may be going to counselling. But it will be difficult to
identify in many cases the precise time at which symptoms of PTSD
manifested themselves. Is it the position that the limitation period
continues to run until that time? If so, it may well have run out before
we reach the time at which the court says the plaintiff is under a
disability, rendering this argument useless for the plaintiff.129
vi. No Limitation Period?
Deficiencies in various other options for dealing with the problem of
limitation periods in civil child sexual abuse cases have been high-
lighted. The author’s preferred approach is the model adopted by
various Canadian provinces, which is to abolish limitation periods in
civil cases involving child sexual abuse (and in some jurisdictions,
other cases as well).
One good example is the Ontario Limitations Act.130 Section 10
provides that the limitation period does not run in cases of sexual
assault or assault while the plaintiff is not capable of commencing the
action due to their physical, mental or psychological condition. There
is a presumption that the person is so incapable at a time prior to
when they bring proceedings in cases where the defendant is in an
intimate relationship with the plaintiff, or the plaintiff is dependent in
some way on the defendant.131 The Labrador and Newfoundland
legislation similarly provides that no limitation period applies in cases
involving sexual misconduct where the plaintiff was under the care of
the defendant, dependent on them, or was a beneficiary of a fiduciary
relationship with the defendant.132 The Saskatchewan legislation pro-
vides that no limitation period applies in cases of sexual misconduct
or where the defendant was living with the plaintiff in an intimate
and personal relationship, or one involving dependency.133 In British
Columbia, no limitation period applies in cases involving sexual
assault of a minor.134
127 (2006) 226 CLR 442.
128 Gleeson CJ and Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ found in this case that ‘post-
traumatic stress disorder of a delayed type does not exist until there are
symptoms’ (ibid. at 458).
129 Further, some statutes provide that disability is only relevant if it existed at the
time the limitation period commenced (Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s.
29(1) and (2)(c); Limitation Act 1950 (NZ), s. 24).
130 Ontario Limitations Act 2002.
131 Ibid. at s. 10(2).
132 Limitations Act 1995, s. 8.
133 Limitation Act 2004, s. 16.
134 Limitation Act 1996, s. 4(k).
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vii. Should There be a Long-stop Period?
Some jurisdictions, including parts of Australia and the United States,
have enacted long-stop provisions, placing an outer limit on the time
within which a claim must be brought, notwithstanding exceptions in
the Act that would otherwise allow the claim. A typical rationale for
the inclusion of such provisions is that they provide fairness:
The date of discoverability is potentially unfair to defendants. The
unfairness arises because, in cases where the date of discoverability
may not occur until many years after the damage-causing event, wit-
nesses may die or be difficult to find, memory may be impaired and
records may be lost. In that event, the defendants could be hampered in
the preparation of their defence and the fairness of the trial may be
prejudiced.135
One of the recommendations of the Ipp Review, adopted by three
Australian states, was that a long-stop provision of 12 years (from the
date on which the alleged negligence took place) be implemented,
subject to an overriding discretion to be given to the court.136
However, as the authors of the Review themselves acknowledged,
such a period is essentially arbitrary,137 seeking as it does to reach a
reasonable compromise between competing interests. The Law Com-
mission was initially in favour of a long-stop period of 30 years, but
abandoned this approach in its Final Report, concluding that in cases
of personal injury, no limitation period should apply. The Commission
explicitly acknowledged the difficulties that a long-stop period would
have in cases of alleged sexual abuse, and accepted that in the context
of such claims there was even less justification for long-stop periods
than in other contexts.138
In my view, concerns underpinning the suggestion of a long-stop
period can be accommodated in other ways. Specifically, the court’s
inherent jurisdiction to decline to hear cases where such a trial would
likely be ‘oppressive’ to the defendant is broad enough to deal with
cases where, due to the lengthy period that has elapsed between the
alleged events and the trial, it would not be possible to have a fair
trial. Such discretion should be relied upon to deal with specific cases
in which this is an issue, rather than a general long-stop rule that its
proponents admit to be arbitrary.
V. Conclusion
A range of jurisdictions continue to struggle to deal with difficult legal
cases involving a claim of child sexual abuse brought many years after
the events. While there is a sound rationale for limitation periods, it is
135 Ipp Review at 92.
136 Ibid. at 93.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid. at 68; Law Commission, above n. 67 at 68.
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not applicable in such cases and new ways must be found to deal with
these issues in a more satisfactory way. The law must be more accom-
modating of the psychology literature concerning survivors of child
sexual abuse. It must abandon its judgment of whether the bringing of
a claim by the survivor was, in terms of the timeframes involved,
‘reasonable’, because it is ill-equipped to make this assessment. It is
not recommended that the concept of fiduciary obligation be the
avenue by which greater flexibility is obtained in such cases. While
the use of the ‘disability’ concept has some merit in terms of allowing
survivors more time within which to claim, it too suffers from un-
certainty in application. The approach of some Canadian provinces, in
abolishing limitation periods in relation to these kinds of cases, is the
most desirable reform. The court will retain its inherent jurisdiction to
make sure that trials are fair to both parties, and to stay proceedings
considered to be frivolous, vexatious or abuse of process, in the rare
times where cases alleging child sexual abuse are deemed to be within
this category.
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